

## INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE

Adam Pautz  
University of Texas at Austin

### 1. Introduction

H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis *Item-Awareness*.

Price accommodated the intuition by adopting a form of Sense Datum Theory. But the Sense Datum Theory faces well-known problems concerning the indeterminacy of perception, contradictory experiences, and aspect-switches. In addition, it is apparently incompatible with a Physicalist theory of mind. These problems have led many to adopt Intentionalism. On this view, experience is essentially representational. It is fair to say that Intentionalism has replaced the Sense Datum Theory as the dominant theory in the philosophy of perception.

Now one might think that Intentionalists must reject *Item-Awareness*. On the Intentionalist view, hallucinatory experience represents that something is there; but there is nothing there, and hence there is no object present to consciousness. Of course, the Intentionalist may allow that hallucinatory experience (or at least especially vivid hallucinatory experience) has a *presentational phenomenology*: it seems to one that one is aware of objects. But one might think that Intentionalists must hold that hallucinatory experience is not genuinely presentational: hallucinatory experience does not genuinely present one with objects.

However, some Intentionalists try to have it both ways. They hold that experience is at once representational and presentational. They aim to accommodate Price's intuition while avoiding the pitfalls of the Sense Datum Theory by replacing sense data with allegedly more innocuous entities. Intentionalists have advocated two views on the objects of hallucinatory experience. First, some Intentionalists claim that in the hallucinatory case one is aware of a *Meinongian*

*object*. Second, many Intentionalists hold that whenever one has an experience one is aware of ordinary *properties* or *universals*, for instance shapes and colors. In the hallucinatory case, one is aware of such properties, but they are not instantiated before one. One is then aware of a cluster of free-floating properties. Unlike the Meinongian option, this option is ontologically conservative: it only requires that there are properties. In fact, this idea is extremely popular, although it has not been much discussed. Intentionalists who adopt either of these options claim that all experience, including hallucinatory experience, has a presentational phenomenology because all experience is genuinely presentational. Some object to Intentionalism by saying that experience is presentational, not representational. If Intentionalists can hold that all experience is genuinely presentational, then this objection rests on a false dichotomy.

I believe that Intentionalism is correct. Here I am interested in the question of whether Intentionalists can accept Price's intuition. I believe that this question is important for two reasons. First, the issue is of intrinsic interest. Price's intuition in favor of Item-Awareness is extremely compelling. It is therefore worthwhile to attempt to determine whether Intentionalists may endorse Price's intuition. Second, I believe that the "transparency observation" is often so formulated as to implicitly presuppose the correctness of Price's intuition, so that whether the much-discussed "transparency argument" for Intentionalism succeeds depends on whether Intentionalists may accept Price's intuition. It is not at all surprising that the transparency observation is often so formulated as to presuppose the correctness of Price's intuition. The transparency observation has its origin in Moore (1903), who advocated the Sense Datum Theory. Moore claimed that, when one focuses on one's experience, one "sees through it" and becomes aware of a sense datum.

I will argue for three theses. First, Intentionalists cannot have it both ways. They cannot accept Price's intuition for the simple reason that this intuition, although compelling, is mistaken. Second, transparency theses which are committed to Item-Awareness are consequently mistaken as well. One might think that there are transparency theses that avoid commitment to Item-Awareness. But I will argue that they are difficult to justify or else they are not substantive, so that they cannot form the basis of an argument for Intentionalism. Therefore, a corollary of the failure of Item-Awareness is that the "transparency argument" for Intentionalism fails. Third, Intentionalists have nothing to fear from this conclusion. The considerations that will arise in the course of our examination of Price's intuition naturally suggest an alternative argument for Intentionalism that does not rely on a transparency thesis.

My plan is as follows. In §2, I formulate two main theses in play: Intentionalism and Item-Awareness. In §3, I describe in greater detail the case for Item-Awareness. In §4, I argue that Item-Awareness is mistaken. In §5, I argue that the transparency argument for Intentionalism consequently fails. In §6, I sketch an argument for Intentionalism which does not rely on any transparency thesis.

## 2. Preliminaries: Intentionalism and Item-Awareness

*Intentionalism* comes in many forms. But here I have in mind the following:

There is a distinctive relation  $R$  such that for every experiential property of the form *having an experience with minimal phenomenal character  $K$* , there is some intentional content  $c$ , such that the property of the form *having an experience with minimal phenomenal character  $K$*  is identical with the property *bearing  $R$  to  $c$*  (or else there is some *type* of intentional content  $T$  such that the experiential property is identical with standing in  $R$  to some *singular* content or other of type  $T$ ).

$K$  is the *minimal phenomenal character* of  $E$  iff there is no more specific phenomenal character that  $E$  possesses. I understand ‘contents’ broadly to include propositions and complex properties. In what follows I will use ‘sensorily entertaining’ to denote the relation  $R$  that satisfies the above, if such there be. Thus I take ‘sensorily entertaining a content’ to be a theoretical notion of Intentionalism, defined by the usual Ramsey-Lewis method, which refers just in case Intentionalism is true. I do not define it in terms of any ‘looks’ locution or in terms of the notion that experiences have “accuracy conditions” in the sense that beliefs do. Therefore, as I explain the notion of the content of an experience, the case for thinking that experiences have contents does not depend on the claim that they have accuracy conditions in the sense that beliefs do. (In fact, because proponents of this claim say that it goes beyond the truism that experiences can be said to be illusory or non-illusory (e. g. Siegel 2006), I am not entirely sure what it means.) Rather, as we shall see in §6, the case for thinking that experiences have contents is the case for thinking that Intentionalism provides the best theoretical account of phenomenology and its cognitive role (Pautz forthcoming a, b). For our purposes, three different forms of Intentionalism will be important. They differ as to whether the contents that constitute phenomenology are *singular propositions*, *general propositions*, or *complex properties*.

On *singular Intentionalism*, when one has a “red-round experience” (an experience with the phenomenal character of the experience one in fact has on viewing a red and round object) while looking at different but exactly resembling red and round objects, one is related to different singular propositions, into which these different objects enter. Further, having a red-round experience is a matter of sensorily entertaining one or another singular proposition of a certain type, namely one whose predicative element is the property of being red and round. This view faces an obvious problem about the hallucinatory case in which no existing object is seen. One view is that a Meinongian object enters into the content of such a hallucinatory experience. Another view is that the relevant proposition is a “gappy” proposition with an empty subject position (for discussion, see Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006).

On *general Intentionalism*, by contrast, having a red-round experience is a matter of sensorily entertaining the general proposition  $\exists x(x \text{ is red and round})$ .

Hallucination poses no special problem for this view. Having a hallucination of a red and round object consists in sensorily entertaining a false proposition according to which something or other is red and round; there need not be any particular object that the proposition is about. Of special concern here will be *general Russellian Intentionalism* (Tye 2000). General Russellian Intentionalism is the conjunction of general Intentionalism and a Russellian theory of propositions. On such a theory, singular propositions are constructions of objects and properties, and general propositions are constructions of properties alone. For instance, the proposition  $\exists x\exists y(x \text{ is red and } y \text{ is green and } x \text{ is to the left of } y)$  is a construction of the properties *being red*, *being green*, and *being to the left of*. As Tye puts it (2000, 48) on this view, properties enter into the intentional contents of our experiences as constituents. Such propositions may be thought of as *possible states of affairs*.

It should be noted that general Intentionalists can allow that non-hallucinatory experiences in some sense have singular contents as well as general contents. For instance, the general Intentionalist might say that the general content of an experience determines its phenomenology while its singular content determines its veridicality-conditions.<sup>1</sup> Hence the general Intentionalist may accept the claim, sometimes made by opponents of Intentionalism (e. g. Martin 2006, Campbell 2002), that in the non-hallucinatory cases objects are in some sense constituents of experiences and their contents.

Note that the mode of composition whereby general propositions are composed of properties does not obey the principle of uniqueness. A mode of composition satisfies uniqueness iff, for any given set of elements, there is exactly one entity constructed of those elements according to that mode of composition. For instance, the proposition  $\exists x\exists y(x \text{ is red and } y \text{ is green and } x \text{ is to the left of } y)$  is different from the proposition  $\exists x\exists y(x \text{ is green and } y \text{ is red and } x \text{ is to the left of } y)$ , even though they are constructed out of the properties *being red*, *being green*, and *being to the left of*. In this way, general Russellian Intentionalism solves Frank Jackson's (1977) Many-Property Problem: the experience of the first scenario and the experience of the second differ because in having these experiences the subject sensorily entertains different general Russellian proposition constructed of the same properties.

Finally, there is the *Property-Complex Theory*. Although they disagree on some issues, Bealer (1982), Forrest (2005), Foster (2000), McGinn (1999) and possibly Dretske (1999, 108) defend something like this theory. On this version of Intentionalism, having an experience with a certain phenomenal character is matter of standing in some relation  $R$  to a *complex property*. So the contents that we "sensorily entertain" are not propositions but complex properties.  $P$  is a *complex property* iff, necessarily,  $x$  instantiates  $P$  iff  $x$  has parts  $x_1, x_2, x_3$  which have properties  $P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots$  and stand in relations  $R_1, R_2, R_3, \dots$  We may refer to complex properties using the device of lambda-abstraction. On this type of Intentionalism, having a red-round experience is a matter of sensorily entertaining the complex property  $\lambda x(x \text{ is red and round})$ . In the hallucinatory

case, there is no object that instantiates this complex property; but defenders of the Property-Complex Theory claim that this complex property still exists, and that the hallucinator bears some kind of intentional relation to it. Just as there can be false propositions, so there can be uninstantiated complex properties. Note that the mode of composition of complex properties, like the mode of composition of general Russellian propositions, does not obey the principle of Uniqueness. For instance, the property  $\lambda x \lambda y (x \text{ is red and } y \text{ is green and } x \text{ is to the left of } y)$  is different from the property  $\lambda x \lambda y (x \text{ is green and } y \text{ is red and } x \text{ is to the left of } y)$ , even though they are constructed of the properties *being red*, *being green*, and *being to the left of*.

As we shall see, many proponents of the Property-Complex Theory also hold that we are *visually aware of* complex properties, even in hallucinatory cases in which the complex properties are not instantiated. But, as I have formulated it, the Property-Complex Theory is neutral on this issue. I formulated the theory by quantifying: there is a relation  $R$  such that having an experience with a certain character is a matter of standing in  $R$  to some complex property. The Property-Complex Theory itself is neutral on the nature of this relation; in particular, it is neutral on the issue of whether it is a relation of awareness. The defender of the property-complex version of Intentionalism might claim that phenomenology is constituted by complex properties without claiming that complex properties are objects of awareness, just as the defender of propositional versions of Intentionalism claim that phenomenology is constituted by propositions without claiming that propositions are objects of awareness. Therefore I will use the technical term ‘sensorily entertaining’ to name the relevant relation and leave it open whether it is a relation of awareness.

Some may say that the Property-Complex Theory is not a form of Intentionalism. But since I equate Intentionalism with the above thesis, and since I understand the ‘contents’ broadly to include complex properties as well as propositions, the Property-Complex Theory counts as a form of Intentionalism in my sense. And there is obviously some justification for counting the Property-Complex Theory as a form of Intentionalism. For the Property-Complex Theory is very similar to general Russellian Intentionalism. Both general Russellian propositions and complex properties are *property-structures*: structures constructed of properties. And both types of structure violate Uniqueness. The only difference is that general Russellian propositions are “saturated” entities that are true or false while complex properties are “unsaturated” entities that are instantiated or uninstantiated. This point leads to another: it is hard to see how one might justify accepting one of these theories over the other. My own view is that singular Intentionalism is unmotivated and that general Russellian Intentionalism or the Property-Complex Theory is correct. But I am neutral between general Russellian Intentionalism and the Property-Complex Theory for this reason.<sup>2</sup>

While Intentionalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experience, *Item-Awareness* is a thesis about the objects of experience: whenever one has a visual experience, even if it is hallucinatory, there is something of which one

is visually aware. Some comments. (i) What is at issue is *item-awareness*, not *fact-awareness*. This distinction has long been emphasized by Fred Dretske (see, for instance, Dretske 1999). In fact, Dretske distinguishes between fact-awareness, object-awareness and property-awareness. I am using ‘item-awareness’ to cover both object-awareness and (if such there be) property-awareness. By stipulation, to be *visually fact-aware that a is F* one must have the concept of *F* and apply it to *a*. By contrast, to be item-aware of *a*, one need not have any particular concept of *a*. For, by stipulation, to be *sensorily item-aware of a* is just to see, hear, touch or otherwise experience *a*; and one may see, hear, touch or otherwise experience *a* without having any particular concept of *a*. For instance, one can be item-aware of an armadillo without having the concept of an armadillo. This distinction is important to the formulation of Item-Awareness for the following reason. Item-Awareness is not the claim that whenever one has an experience there is a fact of which one is potentially aware. This is an uncontroversial claim. For instance, even the Adverbialist might say that whenever one has a visual experience one is potentially aware of the fact that one is having a certain visual experience. Item-Awareness is the more controversial thesis that whenever one has a visual experience there is an item of which one is item-aware. Most Adverbialists, I think, would reject this claim. (ii) Some claim that there is sometimes a weak reading of a report such as ‘Mabel sees a red thing’ at play when we describe hallucinations on which it does not entail the strong claim ‘there is a red thing that Mabel sees’, somewhat as ‘John desires a sloop’ does not entail ‘there is a sloop that John desires’. On this reading, ‘Mabel sees a red thing’ merely describes the phenomenal character of the experience. In my view, this is mistaken: there is only one reading of ‘Mabel sees a red thing’, and on that reading it entails ‘there is a red thing that Mabel sees’. In any case, in my formulation of Item-Awareness, ‘there is’ occurs outside of the scope of ‘sees’. Thus, Item-Awareness entails the strong and controversial claim that even in hallucination there is something that one sees. This, I take it, is the claim of Price. He was not claiming that in all visual experience one sees something in the alleged non-committal sense in which it merely means that it is as if one sees something. (iii) I use ‘there is’ rather than ‘there exists’ for a reason. I would like to ensure that the Meinongian view, to be discussed below, accommodates Item-Awareness. Meinongians will say that when you hallucinate a pink rat there is something of which you are aware, but it does not exist. Since Item-Awareness merely says there is something of which you are aware, the Meinongian view accommodates Item-Awareness. (iv) Finally, ‘item’ is used broadly to cover every category of entity—objects, properties, and so on.

Intentionalism and Item-Awareness are independent. We must distinguish between theories of the phenomenal character of experience and theories of the objects of experience. Intentionalism is a theory of the phenomenal character of experience and Item-Awareness is a theory of the objects of experience. To accept a theory of the objects of experience is not yet to accept a theory of phenomenal character. For instance, suppose that one holds that whenever one has an experience one is aware of something—a Meinongian object, a sense datum, or a

universal. One has not yet said anything about what the phenomenal character of experience consists in. One might go on to claim that having an experience with a certain phenomenal character consists in having a kind of brute, non-intentional awareness of such an item. Alternatively, one might accept Intentionalism, and claim that having an experience with a certain phenomenal character consists in sensorily entertaining a content about such an item. Conversely, accepting a theory of phenomenal character need not automatically commit one to any view on the objects of experience. For instance, Intentionalism does not commit one to any such view. Intentionalists might say that in the hallucinatory case one sensorily entertains a content (a proposition or complex property), but that there is nothing of which one is aware. One is not aware of the properties that enter into the content; nor is one aware of a sense datum or a Meinongian object. This is the view which I will ultimately recommend. For Intentionalists, Item-Awareness is an optional extra.

Nevertheless, many other Intentionalists opt for this extra. Of course, everyone will admit that in the veridical case there is something of which one is aware. But many Intentionalists claim that even in the hallucinatory case there is some item of which one is aware. What might that be? We may distinguish between two types of views compatible with Intentionalism. According to the first type of view, the objects of hallucination are particulars. According to the second type of view, the objects of hallucination are properties.

The view that the objects of hallucination are particulars comes in two versions. On one version, the objects of hallucination are *sense data*. There are different ways to understand 'sense data'. One might define sense data as objects that bear all and only the sensible properties that physical objects appear to have, in some special phenomenal sense of 'appears' (roughly following Jackson 1977). But even if there is such a special sense, phenomena such as the phenomenal sorites and contradictory experiences mean that there are almost certainly no sense data so understood, because in some cases they would have to have contradictory properties (Sanford 1981). Therefore I adopt a different definition: sense data, if such there be, are mental objects of which one is aware in both veridical experience and hallucination. On this definition, there is no requirement that sense data have all and only the sensible properties that physical objects appear to have.

In principle, the Intentionalist might accommodate Item-Awareness by postulating sense data. He might claim that having an experience with a "reddish" phenomenal character *consists in* sensorily entertaining some singular proposition or other of a certain type, a singular proposition of the form *x is red*. This is singular Intentionalism. Now on one version of singular Intentionalism the relevant propositions are about mind-independent objects. But the defender of this view might instead claim that there are sense data, and the relevant propositions are about sense data. The combination of Intentionalism and belief in sense data is very strange because one motivation behind Intentionalism is to avoid sense data. Nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent.<sup>3</sup>

A second version of the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars has it that they are Meinongian objects. On this view, there are things that do not exist. When one has a hallucination of a pink object, there is something of which one is aware, but it does not exist (McGinn 2004, Smith 2002). Further, this object instantiates the property of being pink. In general, the Meinongian objects of hallucination instantiate the apparent properties. Thus, another way for the Intentionalist to accommodate Item-Awareness is by accepting Meinongian objects. For instance, he might say to have an *F* experience is to sensorily entertain a singular proposition of the form *x is F*; in the veridical case the singular proposition is about a physical object, while in the hallucinatory case it is about a Meinongian object. In either case, one is aware of the relevant object. (In the case of illusion, is the object a physical object or a Meinongian object? The case of illusion is a difficult one for the Meinongian. See Smith 2002, 261.) The Meinongian view of hallucinatory objects is analogous to the Meinongian view of fictional objects.

Having considered the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars of some kind, let us turn to the second type of view concerning the objects of hallucinatory experience. The idea here is that in both veridical experience and hallucinatory experience, there are properties of which the subject is aware. In the veridical case, there is also an object that the subject is aware of, and the object instantiates the properties. In the non-veridical case, there is no object of which the subject is aware which instantiates the properties; the subject is aware of the properties without being aware of an object that instantiates the properties. Even if a property is not instantiated (and, presumably, not located), it may still exist; and it may still be an object of awareness, according to this view. Although little-discussed, this view may be found in the writings of many philosophers. For instance, Fred Dretske writes that, when a person has a hallucination of a pink rat,

the person is, to be sure, aware of . . . properties. They are exactly the properties (pinkness, rat shapes, etc.) as those who see pink rats are aware of. In the case of hallucination, though, there is no consciousness of any object that has these properties. We can, if we like, say that the hallucinator or dreamer is aware of certain images as long as we understand that these “images” are not objects (let alone mental objects) that have the properties one hallucinates or dreams that something has. They are, instead, the cluster of properties one hallucinates or dreams that something has. (1995, 102)

Likewise, Michael Tye writes:

. . . even if [a] subject is hallucinating, redness itself exists. The subject is aware of the quality, redness, and undergoes an experience that (mis)represents that something in the vicinity of the viewer has it. This is what happens in the case of experiencing a red after-image, for example. There is no filmy, red spot floating in space, but to the subject it seems that there is. Here the experienced quality, red, has no bearer. (2005, 169)

While they disagree on many other issues, George Bealer (1982), Peter Forrest (2005), John Foster (2000), Mark Johnston (2004), and Colin McGinn (2004) also defend Property-Awareness. It has an analogue in the philosophy of fiction. While some identify fictional objects with Meinongian objects having properties, others simply identify them with fusions of properties. An ontological economy is thereby achieved.

So, a final way, and perhaps the most popular way, for the Intentionalist to accommodate Price's intuition is to claim that the objects of hallucinatory experience are clusters of *uninstantiated properties* (uninstantiated before the subject). For instance, Tye (2000) accepts general Russellian Intentionalism. According to him, when one has a reddish experience, one sensorily entertains the proposition  $\exists x(x \text{ is red})$ . No object enters into this proposition. Still, Tye claims that there is something of which one is aware. If not an object, what might this be? As the above quote indicates, he thinks that one is aware of the *property*, redness, which enters into the proposition. In general, Tye apparently holds that, if *S* sensorily entertains a general Russellian proposition into which some property *Q* enters, then *S* is "directly" aware of *Q*. This is so even if the experience is hallucinatory and the proposition is false.

In addition, nearly all defenders of the Property-Complex Theory also accept Property-Awareness. They do not merely claim that, in the hallucinatory case, we "sensorily entertain" a complex property; they claim that the subject may be said to be aware of the complex property. Granted, on this view, the subject of a hallucination is not aware of any *particulars*. But, according to these philosophers, he is aware of properties, such as colors and shapes. On this view, experience does not merely represent properties; it presents them to consciousness as potential objects of attention. This theory is meant to simulate the Sense Datum Theory while avoiding its unpalatable consequences by replacing mind-dependent sense data with mind-independent properties.

### **3. The Case for Item-Awareness**

I have considered three ways in which the Intentionalist might accommodate Item-Awareness. But why should Intentionalists accept Item-Awareness? For that matter, why should anyone accept it?

I will eventually argue that Item-Awareness is mistaken, and that this makes trouble for the transparency argument for Intentionalism. The aim of the present section is to examine the case for Item-Awareness. I shall consider three arguments for Item-Awareness: an intuitive argument (Price 1932, Smith 2002), an epistemological argument (Johnston 2004), and a semantic argument (Jackson 1977). I will argue that the epistemological argument and the semantic argument are very weak. The intuitive argument has persuasive force but is difficult to evaluate.

Consider the intuitive argument first. As noted in the introduction, according to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware:

When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is a material thing there at all ... One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness ... that something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt ... that it now *exists*, and that *I* am conscious of it—by me at least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be doubted. (1932, 3)

Price would say the same of a mere hallucination of a tomato. This intuitive argument for Item-Awareness is taken seriously by philosophers who do not recognize sense data. Consider the following forceful passage from A. D. Smith:

To say simply that our subject is not aware of anything is surely to underdescribe this situation dramatically ... we need to be able to account for the perceptual attention that may well be present in hallucination. A hallucinating subject may, for example, be mentally focusing on one element in a hallucinated scene, and then another, describing in minute detail what he is aware of ... The sensory features of the situation need to be accounted for. How can this be done if such subjects are denied an object of awareness? (2002, 224–225)

According to Smith, Price was right on one point: there is an item of which one is aware, even in the hallucinatory case. His mistake concerned the nature of this item. It is not a sense datum, but a Meinongian object. Defenders of Property-Awareness, such as Dretske, Tye and Johnston, also agree with Price's core intuition but take a different view: the relevant item is not a sense datum, but a cluster of uninstantiated properties. Price's intuition has also been invoked by Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006) against Disjunctivists who refuse to provide a positive account of hallucination.

Let us note three points. First, in fact, Price makes a claim stronger than Item-Awareness. He does not merely claim that there is something he is aware of; he claims that it is a *particular* which bears properties. Price is explicit about this elsewhere, where he says that what he is aware of is not a universal or attribute, but something that has attributes (1932, 103). But the argument ought to be cast so that it is neutral on the ontological category of the items of which we are aware. It is not plausible that introspection is so discerning that it comments on the ontological category of these items. The introspective intuition is merely that, even in hallucination, there are "elements" or "items" of which one is aware. It is compatible with the intuition that the objects of hallucination are properties, not things that have properties. Second, Price says that there evidently *exists*

some item of which he is aware, and it is clear that he would extend the point to hallucination. As Price expresses the intuition, the view that the objects of hallucination are properties accommodates the intuition (because properties, even if they are uninstantiated, exist), but the view that the objects of hallucination are Meinongian objects does not (because, according to this view, while there are Meinongian objects, they do not exist). However, I shall understand Price's intuition as the intuition that *there is* some item of which one is aware, so that the Meinongian view accommodates the intuition as well. Third, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that Price is offering an argument. Price does not support his belief that there is something he is aware of by citing any further *belief*. He is not offering any *premise* in support of this belief. In this sense, he is not giving an argument at all. Rather, he seems to think that what justifies this belief is simply his experience, or perhaps his introspection on his experience. Likewise, apparently, for Smith.<sup>4</sup>

This makes it difficult to evaluate the argument. For instance, since the argument does not have premises, one cannot check it for validity. The idea is that experience or introspection justifies acceptance of Item-Awareness. Nor can one point out that it rests on a false premise. But, for my part, I find myself very moved by Price's argument. If I knowingly had a vivid hallucination of elephants, I would of course deny that I am aware of elephants. But I would, I think, find it undeniable that there are certain shades of grey of which I am aware. In short, I would find it undeniable that there are some items, in a broad sense of 'items', of which I am aware. In the subsequent section, I will provide reasons to doubt Price's claim. But it cannot be denied that the claim has great face plausibility. In my view, the intuitive argument for Item-Awareness is the best argument.

A second argument for Item-Awareness is very briefly suggested by Mark Johnston (2004). Johnston does not use Price's intuition to argue for Item-Awareness. Instead, his argument relies on the capacity of hallucinatory experience to ground our ability to have *de re* knowledge about properties. Suppose that Mabel hallucinates for some large portion of her life. Then many of her "first-order" beliefs about *objects* are false: for instance, she might falsely believe that there is a red object before her. Still, Johnston holds that it is a pretheoretical datum that she has true "second-order" *de re* beliefs about *properties*, and indeed that these beliefs constitute knowledge:

- [1] The property of being red resembles the property of being purple more than the property of being green.
- [2] The property of being elliptical resembles the property of being circular more than the property of being square.

Johnston maintains that the best explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge is that she is aware of color and shape properties themselves, even if she is not aware of objects that bear these properties. As he says, "how can I do this [learn about a shade of color by hallucination] unless my hallucination involves awareness of

that shade . . . ?” (2004, 131) Hence, the conclusion of his argument is stronger than Item-Awareness. It goes further, asserting that the objects of hallucinatory experience are properties.

Although I agree that Mabel has *de re* knowledge of properties, I believe that this claim is just as theoretical as the claim that she is aware of properties and so cannot be used in an interesting argument for that claim (§6). But let us set this problem aside. There remain two further problems.

First, it is not clear what Johnston’s explanation of Mabel’s *de re* knowledge in terms of Property-Awareness is. On one elaboration, the explanation has two components. The first component is a principle linking item-awareness and the justification of belief. The principle states that, if  $x$  has property  $F$ , and a subject  $S$  is item-aware of item  $x$ , then  $S$  has immediate justification for believing that  $x$  is  $F$ . Likewise, if  $x, y, z \dots$  stand in relation  $R$ , and  $S$  is item-aware of  $x, y, z \dots$ , then  $S$  has immediate justification for believing that  $x, y, z \dots$  stand in relation  $R$ .<sup>5</sup> Call this the *Given Principle*. The second component is Property-Awareness. Although Mabel hallucinates her whole life, and is not aware of any objects, she is aware of the color properties red, purple and green. Now, red, purple and green stand in a certain second-order relation: the first resembles the second more than the third. So, given the Given Principle, it follows that Mabel has immediate justification for believing [1]. Assuming that the further conditions on knowledge are fulfilled, it follows that she knows [1]. Likewise for [2]. The problem is that the Given Principle is false. Suppose that Mabel is aware of a number of colors. And suppose that as it happens they have the following property: *making up 57 colors*. It does not follow that she has immediate justification for believing that they make up 57 colors on the basis of her experience. The failure of the Given Principle is one lesson of the problem of the speckled hen.

But there is a second way of elaborating Johnston’s explanation of how hallucination provides us with justified second-order beliefs concerning the character of properties. The explanation is based on Johnston’s explanation how *veridical* experience provides us with justified first-order belief concerning the character of particulars. Johnston (2004, 2006) holds that in the veridical case one is aware of the instantiations of properties by objects. We might call this *instantiation-awareness*. This mode of awareness must be distinguished from the modes of awareness typically recognized by philosophers of perception. Evidently, being aware of the property-instantiation *the F-ness of a* (instantiation-awareness) must be distinguished from merely being aware of  $a$  (object-awareness). It must also be distinguished from being aware that  $a$  is  $F$ . Fact-awareness is conceptual while instantiation-awareness is pre-conceptual. To be aware that  $a$  is  $F$  one must apply the concept of  $F$  to  $a$ , but to be aware of the  $F$ -ness of  $a$  one need not do so. For instance, one might be aware of the instantiation of a complex shape that one has no concept of. Now if one believes that veridical experience involves instantiation-awareness, one might adopt something like the following principle: if one is aware of the  $F$ -ness of  $a$  and has no reason to believe that defeaters obtain, then one has *prima facie* justification for believing that  $a$  is  $F$ . This principle avoids the problem

about the 57 colors, because one might be aware of 57 colors without being aware of the instantiation by them of the property of making up 57 colors. Hence this principle does not entail that merely being aware of 57 colors provides immediate justification for the belief that 57 colors are present. How might this principle be used to explain Mabel's *de re* knowledge of properties? Mabel is evidently not aware of first-order property-instantiations involving particulars. Nevertheless, she might be aware of second-order property-instantiations involving properties, for instance purple's being reddish-bluish. This awareness might justify her beliefs about the resemblance relations among properties. This explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge requires Property-Awareness. So insofar as we have reason to accept it, we have reason to accept Property-Awareness.

The problem with this explanation is that, provided that Mabel has no reason to believe that defeaters obtain, and provided her hallucinations are sufficiently vivid, she is not only justified in forming second-order beliefs concerning the character of properties on the basis of her experiences; she is also justified in forming general first-order beliefs concerning the character of particulars. For instance, if she has a hallucination of a red square, she is justified in believing that there is before her a red square. Further, her first-order beliefs might be just as justified in the hallucinatory case as they would be in the veridical case. However, on the above epistemological story, in the hallucinatory case, although she is aware of second-order property-instantiations involving properties, she is evidently not aware of first-order property-instantiations involving particulars. So, while the above epistemological story might explain how her second-order beliefs concerning properties are justified, it does not as it stands explain how her general, first-order beliefs are justified. In response, the defender of this epistemological view might offer an alternative account of how Mabel's general, first-order beliefs are justified. For instance, he might say that Mabel forms an introspective belief to the effect that she is having an experience with a certain character, and that the character of the experience is similar to the character of experiences she has had when there has been a red square before her (roughly along the lines of Williamson 2000, 199). As against this, it does not seem that Mabel might form any such belief in order to be justified on the basis of her hallucination in believing that there is a red square before her (we do not typically form such beliefs); indeed, she need not have the concept of experience nor of resemblance. Further, this justification for Mabel's first-order beliefs seems somewhat tenuous. Therefore the proffered explanation does not accommodate the intuition that Mabel's first-order beliefs might be just as justified in the hallucinatory case as they would be in the veridical case.

So the first problem with Johnston's argument is that it is unclear how to elaborate an explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge in terms of Property-Awareness. The second problem is that there is an alternative explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge that discards Property-Awareness and, more generally, any form of Item-Awareness. Consider, for instance, the following Intentionalist explanation. Like the previous explanations in terms of Property-Awareness,

the explanation has two components; but neither requires Property-Awareness. The first component is a general principle linking *the sensorily entertaining of propositions* with the justification of perceptual beliefs: if *S* sensorily entertains the proposition that *x* is *F*, and has reason to believe that defeaters do not obtain, then *S* has *prima facie* justification for believing that *x* is *F*. Like the principle linking instantiation-awareness with justification, this principle escapes the problem of the speckled hen, for Mabel might have an experience of 57 colors without sensorily entertaining the proposition that they make up 57 colors. The second component of the explanation has it that we sensorily entertain two types of propositions. We sensorily entertain first-order propositions that attribute properties to ordinary particulars and second-order propositions that attribute properties to those properties. So, for instance, in the course of her hallucinations, Mabel might sensorily entertain the false first-order proposition that there is before her a unique blue<sub>12</sub> object, a purple<sub>17</sub> object, and a unique green<sub>5</sub> object. But she might also sensorily entertain the true second-order proposition that unique blue<sub>12</sub> is 100% bluish and 0% reddish, that purple<sub>17</sub> is roughly 70% bluish and 30% reddish, and that unique green<sub>5</sub> is 100% greenish, 0% bluish and 0% reddish. This, together with the epistemological principle, entails that Mabel has a justification for believing that the colors have these hue-values. From this, she is able to work out that the first resembles the second more than the third.<sup>6</sup> This explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge does not require Property-Awareness or Item-Awareness. It only requires that Mabel sensorily entertain propositions about the characters of colors. This does not entail that colors are possible objects of *visual awareness*. Perhaps we no more see a property (an abstract object of some kind) when we sensorily entertain a proposition about it than we see the number two when we believe a proposition about it. Further, this epistemological story has an obvious advantage over the explanation in terms of instantiation-awareness. In hallucinatory experience, we sensorily entertain (false) first-order propositions as well as (true) second-order propositions. Therefore, this Intentionalist explanation of perceptual justification accommodates the fact that hallucinatory experience as well as veridical experience may provide us with justification for first-order beliefs as well as for second-order beliefs.<sup>7</sup>

A third argument for Item-Awareness is semantic. Intuitively, the following might be true or at least felicitous:

- [3] There are exactly two hallucinatory objects of which Mabel is aware.
- [4] Hallucinating a little green man, to looked to Mabel as if he was bald (Sainsbury 2005, 253).
- [5] Although both are hallucinating, Mabel sees every color Maxwell sees.
- [6] While undergoing the waterfall illusion, Mabel is aware of movement but nothing that moves (Dretske 1999, 107).
- [7] When her eyes are closed, Mabel is aware of blackness but nothing that is black (Johnston 2004, 141).

The simplest semantic analyses of these sentences take them to be literally true and to require Item-Awareness. In particular, on the simplest analyses, [3] and [4] require that there are hallucinatory objects of which Mabel is aware, and [5] through [7] require that there are properties of which she is aware. But this argument, too, is weak. The argument is successful only if (i) the simplest, “face-value” analyses of these sentences are correct and (ii) such sentences are literally true. Either assumption might be reasonably denied. For instance, one might deny (i), holding that the surface forms of these sentences are misleading. Contrary to appearances, they do not express truths about Mabel’s awareness of peculiar items; instead they express truths about the contents of her experiences. Alternatively, one might deny (ii), holding that, although such sentences do not express truths on their literal readings, they convey truths about the contents of Mabel’s experiences. What truths about the contents of Mabel’s experiences might they convey? One might say that [3] conveys the truth that, if Mabel’s experience were veridical, then there would be two objects of which she is aware; that [4] conveys the truth that Mabel sensorily entertains a content (a proposition or complex property) that disposes her to believe that there is a little bald man present; and that [5] conveys the truth that if Maxwell sensorily entertains a content concerning a color, then Mabel sensorily entertains a content concerning that color. [6] and [7] may be handled similarly. When Mabel is subject to the waterfall illusion, it appears to her that something moves and stands still. On Intentionalism, that is to say that she sensorily entertains a contradictory content according to which there is something that moves and stands still (or maybe according to which something stands still but there is an event of movement taking place). This is what makes [6] felicitous. This interpretation only requires that Mabel is in some sense *related to* a content involving movement; it does not require the bizarre claim Mabel is visually aware of the universal property *movement*, which is neither a thing that moves nor an event of movement, and which is neither located before Mabel nor extended in space. When Mabel’s eyes are closed, she sensorily entertains a content according to which everything is dark. Since the content of her experience is not variegated, it is appropriate although literally false to say that she is aware of blackness but no black object. So [7] is appropriate but literally false. Again, this interpretation only requires that Mabel is in some sense *related to* a content involving blackness; it does not require the bizarre claim that she is visually aware of blackness, an abstract object which is neither located before her nor extended in space.

#### **4. The Case Against Item-Awareness**

As we saw in the previous section, the epistemological argument and the semantic argument for Item-Awareness are very weak. But Price’s intuitive argument has great face plausibility. Therefore, in considering the question of whether we should accept Item-Awareness, the only argument we must take into account is the intuitive argument.

As I have said, I reject Item-Awareness. I accept the Intentionalist view that in the hallucinatory case one “sensorily entertains” a proposition or a complex property. But I hold that there is nothing of which one is aware. One is not aware of the properties that enter into the proposition or complex property; nor is one aware of a sense datum or a Meinongian object. In the present section, I will develop an argument against Item-Awareness. I will suggest that this argument defeats Price’s intuitive argument. The argument takes the form of a dilemma. In §2, I distinguished two types of views concerning the objects of hallucination. According to the first, the objects of hallucination are particulars. According to the second, they are uninstantiated properties. The first view faces well-known problems concerning the indeterminacy of perception and contradictory experiences. The second view, that the objects of hallucination are uninstantiated properties, avoids these problems; but I will argue that it fails for another reason.

Consider first the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars. As noted before, this view comes in two versions. According to the first, the objects of hallucination are sense data. According to the second, the objects of hallucination are Meinongian objects. Now perhaps it will be said that one can rule these views out immediately. The first is apparently at odds with Physicalism. The second requires the claim that there are things that do not exist, which the orthodoxy rejects as contradictory. Still, I think that the force of Price’s intuition means that both views must be taken seriously.

I believe that there is an argument against such views that does not rely on the usual objections. It is well-known that the sense datum view of the objects of hallucination faces problems concerning indeterminate and contradictory experiences (Sanford 1981). A. D. Smith has recently argued (2002) that the Meinongian view is not vulnerable to this argument. But I believe that, if we consider the matter carefully, we see that the Meinongian view is also vulnerable to this argument. I begin by describing the argument against sense data. Then I attempt to show that the same argument applies against Meinongian objects.

Suppose that Mabel has a veridical experience in which a pink object is in the periphery of her visual field. She has a vague impression of the color pink, but not of any specific shade of pink. Now, presumably, it is possible that she should have a hallucination that is exactly like this experience in respect of phenomenal character. In this hallucination, Mabel has a vague impression of a pink object in the periphery of her visual field. This is a case of *the indeterminacy of perception*. In the waterfall illusion, it appears that an object is moving and standing still. Suppose that Maxwell has a hallucination with the same phenomenal character. This is a case of a *contradictory experience* (‘contradictory’ in the sense that its content is necessarily false). In these cases, the believer in sense data will say that the following are true:

[8] There is something of which Mabel is aware.

[9] There is something of which Maxwell is aware.

But now the believer in sense data faces a dilemma as regards the things of which Mabel and Maxwell are aware. First, he might claim that the sense datum in Mabel's periphery has some specific color, for instance pink<sub>17</sub>, even though this specific color is not phenomenally manifest to her (Jackson (1977) accepts this type of solution in the case of the speckled hen). Likewise, in the case of the waterfall hallucination, he might claim that the sense datum of which Maxwell is aware really is not moving, even though it phenomenally seems to him that something is moving. This option is implausible for three reasons. First, if there are sense data, the properties of sense data are causally determined by what happens in the brain. But it is implausible that anything that happens in the brain determines that *a* has pink<sub>17</sub> and not pink<sub>18</sub>. (In the case of the speckled hen, by contrast, I believe that the believer in sense data might plausibly claim that neural processing does determine that the sense datum has a determinate number of speckles, as it might be, 57 speckles; it is just that the subject does not see that there are 57 speckles. So although it is the traditional example, I believe that it provides a weak argument against sense data.) Second, if *a* has pink<sub>17</sub>, why cannot Mabel make out that it has pink<sub>17</sub>? The believer in sense data must now say that there are different degrees of awareness, and that Mabel's awareness of the sense datum is somehow fuzzy. But this notion is difficult to understand. Third, the resulting view would fail to accommodate one of the intuitions behind the introduction of sense data: that the character of experience is wholly determined by the character of the objects presented to consciousness, and does not reside in how we are related to those objects (Price 1932, 5).

The second horn of the dilemma is to say that Mabel is aware of a sense datum that is pink, but no specific shade of pink; and that Maxwell is aware of a sense datum that is both moving and standing still. The problem with this horn, obviously, is that it entails:

- [10] There is something which is pink but no specific shade of pink.
- [11] There is something that is moving and standing still.

Now neither [10] nor [11] is a logical falsehood. [10] does not violate excluded middle and [11] does not have the form 'There is something such that it is *F* and it is not that the case that it is *F*'.<sup>8</sup> Still, intuition has it that they cannot be true. Intuitively, something cannot instantiate a determinable property without instantiating some determinate falling under that determinable. Intuitively, there cannot be *indeterminate objects*. Intuitively, the properties *moving* and *standing still* incompatible, like the properties *being round* and *being square*. Therefore there cannot be an object that instantiates both of these properties. Intuitively, there cannot be *impossible objects*.

Now let us consider Meinongianism. The Meinongian will presumably take the second horn, claiming that [10] and [11] are true. He will say Mabel is aware of an indeterminate Meinongian object and Maxwell is aware of an impossible Meinongian object. But then his view is vulnerable to the following argument: (i)

If Meinongianism is true, then [10] and [11] have readings relative to which they are true. (ii) Ordinary speakers recognize no readings of [10] and [11] relative to which what they express might be true. Therefore, Meinongianism is false. In short, the Meinongian faces the same problem as the believer in sense data who takes the second horn. Indeed, the Meinongian must admit that there are infinitely many situations that defy our modal intuitions: for instance, situations in which all of our non-logical intuitions about property-incompatibility are false, situations in which there are colored but unextended objects, situations in which *after-than* relation is not transitive, and so on. The claim that there literally are such situations seems perverse, even if we cannot causally interact with them.

The standard Meinongian response is to say, as A. D. Smith says, that “Since non-existent objects do not exist, there is no cause to worry over their indeterminacy” (2002, 247). Presumably Smith would also say that there is no reason to worry about their having contradictory properties.<sup>9</sup> Compare a sense datum theorist saying that since data are not physical, there is no need to worry over their being contradictory or indeterminate. But this does not provide an answer to the argument. The Meinongian holds that existing is a primitive property that some objects lack and other objects have. Granted, he does not say that there are objects that have this property and that move and stand still, or that have this property and are pink but no specific shade of pink. But, like the believer in sense data, he still holds that there are objects that move and stand still and that there are objects that are pink but no specific shade of pink. In other words, he still accepts [10] and [11]. The argument given above provides a reason to worry about these claims. What step of the argument is mistaken?

The Meinongian might reject (ii). He might say that there are conversational contexts in which ordinary speakers would assent to [10] and [11]. Asked for examples of things that cannot exist, ordinary speakers might say that things that move and stand still and things that are pink but no specific shade of pink are examples of things that cannot exist. Further, it might be said that, in such a context, ordinary speakers would recognize true readings of [10] and [11]. The Meinongian theory supplies the relevant true readings. The trouble with this reply is that even in this conversational context ordinary speakers would obviously not recognize true readings of [10] and [11].

The Meinongian might reject (i). He might claim that his theory does not have the consequence that [10] and [11] have any true readings by appealing to quantifier domain restriction. He might claim that in the case of [8] and [9] the domain of quantification extends beyond what has the primitive property of existing. He must say this if he wishes to accommodate Price’s intuition, for according to Price’s intuition [8] and [9] express truths. However, he might claim that, for some reason, as soon as we utter [10] and [11], the domain of quantification mysteriously contracts so that it only includes objects that have the primitive property of existing. On such readings, [10] and [11] are true if and

only if there are objects which have the primitive property of existing and that have the relevant properties. The Meinongian may say that this is not true and indeed cannot be true. So the argument is blocked.

There are two problems with this response. First, one would like some kind of semantic rule that explains why the unrestricted readings are available in the case of [8] and [9] but not in the case of [10] and [11]. It would be natural for the Meinongian to hold that it is a rule of English that when a quantifier occurs within the scope of a modal operator the domain of quantification is restricted to what exists. This would entail that in the case of 'It is impossible that there is an object that moves and stands still' the domain of quantification is restricted to what exists, so that this sentence expresses a truth. But, in anticipation of such a move, I chose example-sentences that do not contain modal operators, namely [10] and [11]. The intuition is that what these sentences express cannot be true. Since [10] and [11] do not contain modal operators, the proffered rule does not explain why the unrestricted readings should be available in the case of [8] and [9] but not [10] and [11].

The second problem with the appeal to quantifier domain restriction is that we can unrestricted our quantifiers. For instance, if I say 'every beer—I mean every beer that there is—is in the fridge' you will naturally take me to express a falsehood. Now consider:

- [12] There is—among all that there is—something that is pink but no specific shade of pink.
- [13] There is—among all that there is—something that moves and stands still.

Now the Meinongian must say that, in the case of [12] and [13], just as in the case of [8] and [9], the domain of quantification is unrestricted and includes the objects of which Mabel and Maxwell are aware. So he must say that [12] and [13] are true. Therefore, when the argument is reformulated so as to involve [12] and [13], the Meinongian has no room to maneuver: (i) If Meinongianism is true, then [12] and [13] have readings relative to which they are true. (ii) Ordinary speakers recognize no readings of [12] and [13] relative to which what they express might be true. This is very good evidence that Meinongianism is false.<sup>10</sup>

So, contradictory and indeterminate experiences provide a strong argument against the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars. The view that the objects of hallucination are properties avoids the argument. Consider first the indeterminacy of perception. Defenders of Property-Awareness may say that Mabel is aware of the determinable property pink, but no determinate shade of pink. Further, they may reject the *Instantiation Principle*: the principle that, if one is aware of a property, one must be aware of an object having that property. Thus, they need not say that Mabel is aware of any object that *has* the determinable property pink but not a specific shade of pink. Therefore, they are not committed to [10]. They are committed to determinable properties but not merely determinable objects. Consider next contradictory experiences. Defenders

of Property-Awareness may say that Maxwell is aware of the conjunctive property *moving and standing still*, but not an impossible object which has this property. They are committed to impossible properties but not impossible objects. Further, Property-Awareness is ontologically conservative. It does not require that there are things that do not exist: properties exist in the perfectly ordinary sense, even if they are not instantiated. And most philosophers would be prepared to accept the existence of properties on grounds independent of the philosophy of perception. In short, Property-Awareness accommodates Price's intuition while avoiding all the problems with the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars. The allure of Property-Awareness is undeniable.

But I believe that Property-Awareness is false for reasons independent of the indeterminacy of perception and contradictory experiences. I shall consider several arguments against Property-Awareness. It is only the last argument which I shall consider that I regard as decisive.

First, one might think that, in general, if  $x$  is aware of  $y$ , then  $y$  then  $y$  looks some way to  $x$ . Suppose that Mabel hallucinates a red and round object. By the principle, if she is aware of redness, redness must look some way to her. But what way? Obviously, it does not look red to her. It *is* the color red and the color red is not itself red; rather things that have this color are red. So it would be peculiar if redness itself looked red to Mabel. More generally, there is no way in which redness looks to Mabel. So, given the principle, she cannot be aware of it (Byrne 2003, 655).

But there are two replies to this argument which are not entirely implausible. First, one might accept the principle but claim that there are plausible answers to the question: how does redness look to Mabel? True, it does not look red. But perhaps it looks saturated, not too bright, more like orange than green, and so on. Second, one might deny the principle. In fact, Michael Tye does exactly that:

In general, in my view, it is a mistake to model our awareness of qualities on our awareness of particulars. When we see particulars they look various qualities but the qualities themselves do not look any way (2006, note 20).

A second argument against Property-Awareness is based on the general principle that if  $x$  is aware of  $y$  then  $x$ 's experience is caused by  $y$ . Now, presumably, when Mabel has a hallucination of a red thing, the property redness does not cause her experience: this property is not instantiated before her. So, given this principle, it follows that she is not aware of redness. But, again, one might reject the principle. One might make the rejection of the principle more palatable by noting two points. First, one might say that the principle holds for the awareness of particulars but not the awareness of properties. In Dretske's terms, it holds for object-awareness but not property-awareness. Second, one might argue that the principle is not apriori even in the case of the awareness of particulars (Johnston 2004, 171–3).

A third argument against Property-Awareness is based on the claim that, if we are aware of properties, then we would expect that we should just be able to *see* that there are properties, and so know by sight that Realism about properties is right. As Byrne puts it, “nominalists . . . failed to pay attention to the evidence of their own eyes” (2003, 655). (Byrne does not explicitly endorse the present argument.) But, as this is not the case, properties cannot be objects of awareness. But this argument implicitly relies on the false principle that from the fact that *S* sees *x* (e. g. Orcutt, or the color red), together with the fact that *x* is an *F* (that Orcutt is a spy, that the color red is a universal), it follows that *S* can see that there are *F*s (there are spies, there are universals).

A fourth argument against Property-Awareness asserts that the awareness of uninstantiated properties is at odds with Physicalism. One might think this for two reasons. First, suppose that Mabel has a hallucination of red<sub>17</sub>, but nothing is red<sub>17</sub>. Then, according to Property-Awareness, Mabel is aware of an uninstantiated (and presumably non-located) property. Is that not at odds with Physicalism? Second, even if we assume that the existence of such an item is compatible with Physicalism, one might think that the claim that Mabel has *awareness of* such an item is at odds with Physicalism.

But, again, there are replies. In answer to the first problem, the defender of Property-Awareness might claim that there is no conflict between Physicalism and belief in uninstantiated properties, just as there is no conflict between Physicalism and belief in other abstract objects such as numbers. In particular, if uninstantiated properties are necessary existents, then they are compatible with the Physicalist claim that every minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate *simpliciter*. In response to those leery of uninstantiated properties on grounds independent of Physicalism, the defender of Property-Awareness might point out that, while acceptance of Property-Awareness should be combined with acceptance of uninstantiated properties,<sup>11</sup> these uninstantiated properties can be treated as constructions of fundamental properties that are instantiated at our world. For instance, he might say that red<sub>17</sub> is identical with a reflectance property. A reflectance property is a complex property constructed of properties concerning length and energy. He might then claim that, while red<sub>17</sub> is uninstantiated, the fundamental physical magnitudes from which it is built are instantiated.

In answer to the problem about providing a physicalist theory of our awareness of uninstantiated universals, the defender of Property-Awareness might say any of a number of things. For instance, he might say that Mabel and the uninstantiated (and unlocated) property red<sub>17</sub> stand to one another in the following counterfactual physical relation: *x* is in a sensory state that *would be* caused by the instantiation of *y*, if *y* were instantiated in front of *x* under optimal conditions. Then he might identify the relevant awareness relation with this physical relation (Tye 2000, 136).

Now in my view the strongest argument against Property-Awareness takes the form of a dilemma. There are two views on properties available to the defender

of Property-Awareness: properties as tropes, and properties as universals. (I set aside the view that properties are sets of *possibilia* because it requires modal realism.) Under each theory, Property-Awareness is false. To illustrate the theories, consider the class of red<sub>17</sub> things. (For purposes of illustration, I assume Realism about color.) Then the two theories go as follows.

On the trope theory, for each red<sub>17</sub> thing, there is a distinct item located where that thing is: a red trope. All these tropes resemble exactly. Tropes are *essentially* located. Further, most trope theorists treat them as extended in space. There are difficulties with this position (Armstrong 1989, 115), but here I will assume that if there are tropes then they are extended. Most trope theorists identify objects with bundles of compresent tropes. The predicate ‘*x* is compresent with *y*’ is a basic predicate in the ideology of the theory.

Consider Property-Awareness with properties taken as tropes. The resulting view is very strange. Presumably, on this view, when Mabel hallucinates, her brain shoots tropes into the physical space before her, or perhaps some mental space. These tropes are aberrant tropes: they are not bundled with any other tropes. And Mabel is aware of these tropes. Obviously, this view faces the same problems as belief in sense data. What is the nature of a color trope in the periphery of her visual field? How might this view be reconciled with Physicalism?

In fact, all the defenders of Property-Awareness accept the Universals theory (Dretske 1999, 107; Forrest 2005; Foster 2000, 188; Johnston 2004, 135; Tye 2000, 103). On the Universals theory, all the red<sub>17</sub> objects instantiate the same item, red<sub>17</sub> (Armstrong 1989). On most versions of the theory, objects belong to a separate ontological category from universals: they are not mere constructions of universals. The predicate ‘*x* instantiates *y*’ is a basic predicate in the ideology of the theory. Further, the item, red<sub>17</sub>, does not have spatial extent. It is instantiated by things that have size. But it has no size itself.

There are two versions of the Universals theory, differing on the issue of whether red<sub>17</sub> is located. On the Transcendent version, red<sub>17</sub> is not located. On the Immanent version, it is located: it is located wherever there is a red<sub>17</sub> thing. Thus, on this view, while it is not extended, it is still located. It is a non-spatiotemporal part of red<sub>17</sub> things. Note that on this view it is not the case that red<sub>17</sub> somehow divides into many things. Rather, the idea is that red<sub>17</sub> is one thing, but it is multiply located. It is a one running through the many.

Now consider Property-Awareness with properties taken as universals. Recall that Mabel has a hallucination as of a red and round thing at a certain distance from her. Let *U* be the universal redness and let *R* be the universal roundness. The Intentionalist who accepts Property-Awareness puts forward two claims. First, as an Intentionalist, he maintains that her having this experience consists in her sensorily entertaining a *proposition* or a *complex universal* involving *U* and *R*. Second, the Intentionalist who defends Property-Awareness holds that Mabel is visually aware of *U* and *R*. Call this *Universals-Awareness*.

I have no objection to the first claim and indeed accept it. As an Intentionalist, I hold that Mabel’s having a hallucination with the relevant character consists

in her standing in a *relation* to a non-extended object: a proposition or complex universal involving *U* and *R*. I have dubbed this relation ‘sensorily entertaining’. What I reject is the second claim: that Mabel can be said to be aware of *U* and *R*. What I deny is that the relevant sensory relation is one of *visual awareness*. I reject Universals-Awareness because I believe that the argument against it overcomes the argument for it.

Let us first consider the argument for Universals-Awareness. As I said in §3, the semantic and epistemological arguments for Item-Awareness are weak. A version of Intentionalism that rejects the thesis that we are aware of the universal properties that enter into the contents of our experiences accommodates the epistemological and semantic facts just as well as a version of Intentionalism that incorporates this thesis. So, as far as these arguments are concerned, this thesis is entirely gratuitous. But I find very compelling Price’s intuitive argument for Item-Awareness. Let us assume that, in view of the problems concerning indeterminate and contradictory experiences, universals are the only good candidates to be objects of hallucinatory experience. This is the case for Universals-Awareness.

The case against Universals-Awareness is based on two intuitive principles. The first is as follows:

[#] If *x* is visually aware of *y* (if *x* sees *y*), then *y* is spatially extended.

Since *U* and *R* are not extended, it follows from [#] that Mabel cannot be aware of them. They are not potential object of awareness. Maybe she can *think* of them; but they are not the type of thing she can *see* (just as she cannot see unextended spacetime points). Similar *a priori* constraints apply to awareness in other modalities. For instance, if *x* is auditorily aware of *y*, then *y* must be temporally extended.

Now one might think that the true constraint on visual awareness should be formulated as follows:

[\$] If *x* is visually aware of *y* (if *x* sees *y*), then *y* must *look* extended to *x*.

In the above quote, Tye says that universal properties need not look anyway to us in order for us to be aware of them. As against this, it is intuitively impossible to see something unless it at least looks extended. But [\$] as well as [#] entails that Mabel cannot be visually aware of *U* and *R*. For *U* and *R* do not look extended to Mabel. I offer three arguments for this claim. (Johnston (2004, 142) claims that, although universals do not move, they may “strike us” as moving. Perhaps he would also hold that they can strike us as being extended. If *U strikes S as F* means *U looks F to S*, then I believe that my arguments are also arguments against this claim.) First, *U* and *R* are necessarily unextended. Therefore it is hard to understand how they might look extended to Mabel. Second, if *U* and *R* look extended to Mabel in the hallucinatory case, then presumably they look extended to her in the veridical case when she really sees a single red and round

object. But this has the absurd consequence that in the veridical case three things look extended to her: the object, *U* and *R*. Third, if a thing looks extended to one, it looks to have a certain shape (except perhaps if the thing is in the periphery). But what shapes do *U* and *R* look to have to Mabel?

I believe that the argument against Universals-Awareness based on [#] and [\$] overcomes the argument for it based on Price's intuition because I believe that there are reasons to doubt the argument for Universals-Awareness based on Price's intuition but no reasons to doubt the argument against it based on [#] and [\$].

There are two reasons to doubt the argument for Universals-Awareness based on Price's intuition. First, I have assumed that the intuition is unspecific. The intuition is simply that whenever one has a visual experience there are some items of which one is aware. But, as Alex Byrne has pointed out to me (in conversation), the intuition might be more specific, namely that there some items at *specific locations* of which one is aware. Now when one hallucinates, the relevant universals are not at the relevant locations (if they are located at all, they are located far away, where they are actually instantiated). This casts doubt on the claim that Price's intuition supports Universals-Awareness. Second, there is in any case a way to explain away Price's intuition. Hallucinations can be similar to non-hallucinatory experiences. When we have non-hallucinatory experiences, we are aware of items. Therefore, when we have vivid hallucinations, we are likely to have an irresistible tendency to believe that we are aware of items, even if this is not the case (Evans 1982, 200). This casts doubt on Price's intuition itself.

On the other hand, there is no good reason to doubt the argument against Universals-Awareness based on [#] and [\$]. Apparent counterexamples to [#] and [\$] fall into three categories. (i) The principles [#] and [\$] are only supposed to apply to visual-item awareness, but many apparent counterexamples do not involve visual-item awareness, so that they are not genuine counterexamples. For instance, the possibility of being aware of the meaning of a sentence is not a counterexample, because the awareness involved is non-visual fact-awareness to the effect that a sentence has a certain meaning. (ii) Other apparent counterexamples are provided by the claims [5] through [7] discussed §3, which appear to require for their truth that Mabel is aware of unextended universal properties. But these are counterexamples only if the correct analyses of these claims are the ones suggested by their surface form and such claims are literally true. And both of these assumptions may be reasonably denied. (iii) Finally, there are apparent hypothetical counterexamples to [#], for instance seeing an unextended electron. But I cannot imagine such a case. I can imagine seeing a blip on a screen and thereby acquiring information about an electron. In such a case it might even be correct to say that I see that (fact-awareness) the electron is at a certain location. (Compare seeing that the gas tank buried deep in the car is low by seeing the gas gauge.) But this is not a case of visual item-awareness of the unextended electron. I do not see the electron but the blip on the screen.

Further, the case could not be a counterexample to [S] because presumably the electron will at least have to *look* extended if it is to be seen.

So the objects of hallucinatory experience can be neither particulars (this option is ruled out by indeterminate and contradictory hallucinations) nor universal properties (this option is ruled out by [#] and [S]). This brings me to my first thesis:

*First Thesis:* Price's intuition in favor of Item-Awareness is very compelling. Many Intentionalists try to have it both ways; they attempt to combine Intentionalism with Item-Awareness. But they cannot have it both ways, not because there is a conflict between Intentionalism and Item-Awareness, but because the best view is that Item-Awareness is false.

This thesis leads to the following picture. As noted in §1, all visual experience, including hallucinatory experience, has a presentational phenomenology. In all visual experience it seems to one that one is aware of items of some kind. Intentionalists who accept Item-Awareness claim that all experience has a presentational phenomenology because it is genuinely presentational: it presents us with Meinongian objects or properties. But I have argued that this is not so. Hallucinatory experience has a presentational phenomenology but it is not genuinely presentational. In hallucination we sensorily entertain a proposition or perhaps a complex property. This gives us the vivid impression that we are aware of items of some kind. But this impression is mistaken.

This picture invites a question. On Intentionalism, experiences are a type of intentional state akin to thoughts. Why then do experiences, including hallucinatory experiences, have a presentational phenomenology while thoughts do not? In rejecting Item-Awareness, I have left behind one answer: experiences, although a species of intentional states, differ from thoughts in that they genuinely present one with items (objects or properties). What then is my answer? My answer to this question is that there is no answer. Some intentional states (*believing* contents, *desiring* contents) do not have a presentational phenomenology. Other intentional states do have a presentational phenomenology: states in which one stands in the special "sensory" relation to contents (propositions or complex properties) which I have dubbed 'sensorily entertaining'. (Or at least some episodes of standing in this sensory relation to contents have a presentational phenomenology; perhaps in imaginings and dreams we stand in the same relation to contents but because the contents are quite indeterminate the experiences lack a presentational phenomenology.) The state of having an experience as of the vivid presence of a red thing at a certain place just is the state of standing in this special relation to a detailed content according to which there is a red thing at a certain place. To ask for an explanation of why this intentional state has a presentational phenomenology is to ask for an explanation of this identity; and in general identities do not need to be explained. Indeed, the request for an explanation may be pressed in the case of *any* theory of phenomenal character.

Why should being in a state with certain non-relational “qualia”, or having certain sensorimotor expectations, have a rich presentational phenomenology? In these cases, too, the question is misconceived, and for the same reason. Of course, one might say that, intuitively, having an experience with a certain presentational phenomenology simply cannot consist in standing in a relation to a non-extended entity such as a proposition or a complex property. One might think that it can only consist in standing in a relation to an extended object.<sup>12</sup> But I think that this is an intuition we must reject because, for reasons that I will sketch in §6, I believe that Intentionalism is the best overall theory of phenomenal character.

It may be wondered why so many Intentionalists accept Item-Awareness and, in particular, Universals-Awareness. I believe that the reason is that we have a tendency to understand Intentionalism on the model of the Sense Datum Theory. This tendency is evident in the passage from Dretske quoted in §2, where he claims that we may speak of a cluster of universals as an ‘image’. There are several reasons for this tendency. First, Intentionalism is often cloaked in the language of the Sense Datum Theory. The Sense Datum Theorists claim that phenomenology is determined by the *array of sense data* given to consciousness. Intentionalists claim that it is determined by our relation to contents (propositions or complex properties); and many Intentionalists identify the relevant contents with *arrays of universal properties*. In fact, Tye (2000, 103) even claims that universals cannot appear other than they are, just as the Sense Datum Theorists claimed that sense data cannot appear other than they are. Second, we have a general tendency to *substantialize* universals: to treat them like little extended particulars (Armstrong 1989, 97). For these reasons, perhaps Intentionalists have a tendency to think of the contents of our experiences as composed of arrays of extended items. When we think of the contents of our experiences as arrays of extended items, the notion that we may be aware of the elements of those contents may seem quite plausible. But, needless to say, this is a mistaken conception of Intentionalism. Intentionalism is quite different from the Sense Datum Theory.<sup>13</sup>

## 5. Transparency and Item-Awareness

It is often said that experience is transparent. Then it is said that this is compatible only with the Sense Datum Theory and Intentionalism. Since the Sense Datum Theory fails, we must accept Intentionalism.

I believe that this is a bad argument. Transparency theses may be divided into two categories. Some harbor commitment to the claim that we have item-awareness even in the hallucinatory case. Even if one does not believe that I have shown that Item-Awareness is false, one must at the very least admit that I have shown that it is very difficult to justify. Hence transparency arguments that rely on such a transparency thesis are bad arguments in the sense that they are founded on a thesis that is very *difficult to justify*. Others transparency theses avoid commitment to the claim that we have item-awareness even in the hallucinatory

case. But they are *not substantive*: contrary to the transparency argument, they are compatible with every theory of phenomenal character, not only the Sense Datum Theory and Intentionalism. Whichever type of transparency thesis is plugged into the transparency argument, the resulting argument is weak.

Let us begin with transparency theses that harbor commitment to Item-Awareness. Consider, for instance, the *objects version* of the transparency thesis:

- [14] Whenever someone knows what her experience is like, there are some objects that she experiences and she knows what her experience is like by attending to these objects (Martin 1998, 17).

But hallucination poses an obvious problem. The defender of [14] might claim that the hallucinator attends to a sense datum or Meinongian object. But, as we have seen, these claims are difficult to justify. Therefore [14] is very difficult to justify. At the very least, it does not have the feature that transparency theses are typically supposed to have: that of being obvious on the basis of pretheoretical reflection on our experiences. Therefore [14] is not suitable as a premise in an argument for Intentionalism.<sup>14</sup>

Now let us consider another transparency thesis that harbors commitment to Item-Awareness, the *properties version* of the transparency thesis:

- [15] Whenever someone knows what her experience is like, there are some properties that she experiences (properties which are not properties of her experiences) and she knows what her experience is like by attending to these properties (Tye 2000; Chalmers 2006, 62).

This provides a uniform account of how we know what our veridical and hallucinatory experiences are like: in both cases we know this by attending to properties. It is just that in the hallucinatory case the properties are not instantiated.

But if the relevant properties are taken to be simple visual properties and relations, then many-property situations (Jackson 1977) show that [15] is false. Suppose that Mabel hallucinates a red object above a green object and Maxwell hallucinates a green object above a red object. Then they know that their experiences have different phenomenal characters, but they are aware of the same simple visual properties and relations: namely, redness, greenness, and aboveness. Hence they do not know that their experiences have different phenomenal character merely by attending to simple visual properties and relations. To solve this problem, the defender of [15] might appeal to *property-structures* (§2):

- [16] Whenever someone knows what her experience is like, there is a property-structure that she experiences and she knows what her experience is like by attending to this property-structure.

As we saw in (§2), general propositions or states of affairs and complex properties are two types of property-structures. Now the defender of [16] might claim that Mabel and Maxwell are no longer counterexamples, the thought being that they know that their experiences have distinct phenomenal characters by attending to distinct property-structures built up from the same simple visual properties and relations. But [16] is a very theoretical claim that is difficult to justify. As we have seen (§4), for good reason the defender of Property-Awareness takes properties to be universals rather than tropes. Then property-structures are non-extended, non-located items with some kind of arcane, non-spatial structure (as it might be, set-theoretic structure). But then [16] is difficult to justify for two reasons. First, it is difficult to justify the claim that there are property-structures at all (Lewis 1986). Second, [16] entails that we have Universals-Awareness in the hallucinatory case. As we have seen, Universals-Awareness may be ruled out *a priori*. At the very least, it is very difficult to justify.

It may be said that the problem here is mostly verbal: if we formulate [16] by saying that we know what our experiences are like by standing in some relation *R* to property-structures (uninstantiated or false ones in the case of hallucination), where this does not entail that we literally see or attend to property-structures, then the problem no longer applies (a suggestion made by David Chalmers in conversation). I disagree. With this change, I think that [16] *may be true*. If, as I think may be the case, a version of Intentionalism on which experiences are relations to property-structures is correct, then it may be plausible to suppose that we know what our experiences are like by standing some sensory relation (not awareness!) to these property-structures. But I still insist that [16] is difficult to justify because even once this change has been made it immediately entails a claim about the structure of hallucination that is difficult to justify: that we are sensorily related to property-structures in hallucination. Maybe a nominalistic version of the Sense Datum Theory is correct, and in hallucination we are only related to an array of mental particulars. Or maybe in hallucination we are not related to anything at all, and it merely seems to us as if we are. In my view, we are only justified in accepting something like [16] *after* we are justified in accepting Intentionalism. Hence [16] cannot be used as a premise in an argument *for* Intentionalism.

It is not surprising that influential transparency theses harbor a commitment to Item-Awareness. For they have their origin in Moore (1903), and Moore accepted the Sense Datum Theory. He assumed that whenever one has an experience there is something of one is aware. And his formulation of transparency takes this for granted: he says when we try to focus on our experience we see through it to *what we experience*.

Nevertheless, there are transparency theses that avoid commitment to Item-Awareness, for instance:

- [17] Whenever one knows what one's experience is like, one knows this by knowing some fact of the form *one has an experience that represents that something is F* (Crane 2001, 141).

The problem is that [17] contains the technical term ‘*x* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’. We have no business having an intuition about whether it is true before this technical term is explained to us. Indeed, some opponents of Intentionalism deny that our experience represent at all. One idea is that ‘*x* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’ is a theoretical term of Intentionalism: ‘*x* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’ is equivalent to ‘*x* sensorily entertains a content according to which something is *F*’. Now I treat ‘sensorily entertaining’ as a theoretical term of Intentionalism defined by description: it denotes the relation *R* such that having an experience with a certain character is identical with standing in relation *R* to some content (see §2). But now an obvious problem arises: given this explanation, to be justified in accepting [17] we must first be justified in accepting Intentionalism. For then the expression ‘*x* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’ has application only if Intentionalism is true. So understood, [17] is obviously not a suitable premise in an argument for Intentionalism.

To avoid this problem, the Intentionalist might attempt to gloss ‘*S* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’ in terms of ordinary language, so that it does not presuppose the truth of Intentionalism. For instance, suppose that one glosses ‘*S* has an experience that represents that something is *F*’ as ‘*S* has an experience as of an *F* object’. Then we obtain:

[18] Whenever one knows what one’s experience is like, one knows this by knowing some claim of the form *one has an experience as of an F object*.

Now I have argued that transparency theses that harbor commitment to Item-Awareness are *difficult to justify*. The problem with [18], by contrast, is that it is *not substantive*. For instance, the Adverbialist may perfectly well accept [18]. He may agree with the Intentionalist that one know that one has a “reddish” experience, for instance, by knowing that one has an experience as of a red object. He will just offer a different analysis of this knowledge-claim than the Intentionalist. On his view, to have an experience of a red object is to “experience redly”, rather than to sensorily entertain a content according to which something is red. So, he will agree that one know that one has a “reddish” experience by knowing that one has an experience as of a red object: for him, this means that one knows that one is has a reddish experience by knowing that one experiences redly. Since [18] may be accepted by everyone, it is not a suitable premise in an argument for one view over another.

I conjecture that this type of problem will afflict *every* transparency thesis that does not harbor commitment to Item-Awareness and that is formulated in terms of our ordinary descriptions of experience.<sup>15</sup> The point is a familiar one. Different philosophical theories of perception—for instance, Adverbialism, Sense Datum Theory, and Intentionalism—may agree on the truth of our ordinary descriptions of experience; they only disagree on their *analysis* (Jackson 1977). So, for any true transparency thesis that is meant to be an ordinary and plausible

description of experience, it seems that all theorists may agree that it is true; they will just offer competing interpretations of it. To show that one competing interpretation is true and the others false, one will have to use premises in addition to the proffered transparency thesis. For instance, in the next section I will argue that non-relational views such as Adverbialism do not accommodate the intuition that experience necessarily grounds the capacity to have beliefs involving properties of extended objects. But now the transparency thesis is no longer doing any work.

This brings me to my second thesis:

*Second Thesis:* Transparency theses that presuppose the correctness of Price's intuition in favor of Item-Awareness are difficult to justify because Item-Awareness is difficult to justify. Those that do not are not substantive—they can be accepted by everyone. Therefore, a corollary of the case against Item-Awareness is that it is unlikely that there is a transparency thesis that could serve as a secure foundation on which to construct an argument for Intentionalism.

## 6. Sketch of an Alternative Argument for Intentionalism

So far, my conclusions have been negative. But I will end with a positive suggestion. Intentionalists have nothing to fear from the failure of the transparency argument for Intentionalism. The considerations that have arisen in the course of my examination of Item-Awareness provide the basis of another argument for Intentionalism. Let *E* be the property of having an experience with the phenomenal character of the experience one in fact has on viewing a red ellipse, an orange circle and a green square. Say that someone has *V* iff she has *E* while undergoing a veridical experience, that someone has *I* iff she has *E* while undergoing an illusion, and that someone has *H* iff she has *E* while undergoing a hallucination. Intentionalism holds that having *E* is identical with the property of sensorily entertaining a general proposition or complex property that may be represented as follows: <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. The argument for Intentionalism I have in mind has three stages. The first stage argues for a “relational view” of *H* on the basis of a point that is similar to but distinct from Johnston's point about the cognitive role of hallucination that I discussed in §3. The second stage argues that the best relational view of *H* is an intentionalist view on the basis of the considerations about indeterminate and contradictory experiences that I discussed in §4. The third argues that once we accept an intentionalist account of *H* we should also accept an intentionalist account of the more general state *E*.

*The first stage.* On a relational view of *H*, having *H* is a matter of standing in a relation to items involving properties which, if they are properties of anything at all, are properties of extended objects.<sup>16</sup> Here I will simplify by considering only the Sense Datum Theory and Intentionalism. On the Sense Datum Theory,

having *H* is a matter of being aware of a red and elliptical mental object, an orange and circular mental object, and a green and square mental object, while not seeing any physical objects. On Intentionalism, having *H* is a matter of sensorily entertaining the false proposition or uninstantiated complex property <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. Notice that the relational view of *H* does not entail that in having *H* one would be *aware of* anything. An example of a *non-relational view* of *H* is the Identity Theory (Block forthcoming, McLaughlin forthcoming). On this view, having *H* is necessarily identical with being in a certain internal brain state.

One argument for the relational view of *H* is based on a transparency thesis. But I have argued that this argument is problematic. An alternative argument for the relational view of *H* is based on Johnston's claim that hallucination provides *de re* knowledge of properties. I believe that this is a step in the right direction. But, as I noted in §3, I believe that this claim, while it may be true, is too theoretical to be the starting point in an argument for a relational view of *H*. However, I believe that another claim about the cognitive role of *H* may provide such a starting point. For some reason, suppose that you have never before encountered the colors red, orange or green, nor elliptical, circular or square shapes. Intuitively, having *H*, *no less than having its veridical counterpart V*, would endow you with the capacity to have certain *general beliefs*:

- [19] There is a red ellipse, an orange circle and a green square.
- [20] Red is more like orange than green.
- [21] Ellipses are more like circles than squares.

Indeed, it is intuitively metaphysically necessary that, if an individual who is capable of having beliefs at all has *H*, he will have the additional capacity to have the specific beliefs expressed by [19]–[21], and he will have this additional capacity because he has *H*. Call this the *grounding intuition*. Note that the claim is not that *H* endows an individual with *knowledge* of [19]–[21] or a *justification* for believing [19]–[21]—although I believe that this is true too. Rather, the claim which needs explaining is simply that *H* endows an individual with the capacity to have certain beliefs. Note also that the claim is not a theoretical one about *de re* knowledge of properties. It may be that [19]–[21] enjoy nominalistically acceptable analyses. So I believe that the grounding intuition is a suitable starting point in an argument for a relational view of *H*. It is only after additional argument that we arrive at a claim about properties. For [19]–[21] do not enjoy nominalistically acceptable analyses. To state their truth-conditions, it is necessary to use predicates expressing properties of extended objects, or names designating such properties, or quantifiers ranging over such properties. The grounding intuition, together with this theoretical claim, entails that *H* necessarily endows an individual who has it with the capacity to be cognitively related to properties of extended objects. (It is no part of the claim that the relation is *de re* under any disambiguation of this term.) For reasons that I cannot go into here, I believe that this can only be

so if *H* is itself a relational state: a relational state that is more basic than belief in which the subject is sensorily related to those properties. The connections that a non-relational state (for instance, a brain state) has with such properties are bound to be contingent. So no non-relational state could do what *H* does: *necessarily* endow individuals with this capacity.

I also believe that the grounding intuition rules out “Negative Disjunctivism”. I define *Disjunctivism* as the view that there is an experiential property *E* that is common to *V*, *I* and *H*, but that it is analyzable in terms of some *success state*. *S* is a success state iff, necessarily, if a person is in *S*, then *p* obtains, where *p* is some proposition about the external world. Disjunctivism is so-called because the simplest such analyses are disjunctive in form. Disjunctivism thus stands opposed to the *Common Factor Theory*, which I define as the view that *E* is not analyzable (disjunctively or otherwise) in terms of a success state. Intentionalism, then, is a version of the Common Factor Theory. *Negative Disjunctivism* analyzes *E* in terms of being in a state that bears a certain negative epistemic relation to some success state. In one version, it holds that having *E* is a matter of either seeing I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square) or else undergoing an event that cannot be discriminated by reflection from seeing I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square), where I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square) represents the worldly co-instantiation of the relevant properties. (Note that the first disjunct is redundant because when it is satisfied the second disjunct will be satisfied as well.) In the hallucinatory case *H*, one satisfies the second disjunct. The grounding intuition, in my view, rules out Negative Disjunctivism because merely failing to have a certain type of knowledge could not *ground* or *explain* the capacity to have the beliefs expressed by [19]–[21]. We must give a positive account of *H* to account for the fact that it may play a positive explanatory role. Disjunctivists often say that we need a relational view of veridical experience to explain how veridical experience grounds the capacity for singular thoughts that have certain particulars as their subject constituents (Campbell 2002). My point is that we likewise need a relational view of hallucinatory experience to explain how hallucinatory experience grounds the capacity for general thoughts that have certain properties as their predicative constituents.

*The second stage.* The Sense Datum Theory and Intentionalism about *H* are both compatible with the grounding intuition about *H*. For instance, the general Intentionalist might say that the general content of the belief expressed by [19] is simply inherited from the general content of *H*. The second stage argues that Intentionalism is superior to the Sense Datum Theory on the basis of the considerations about indeterminate and contradictory experiences discussed in §4. Intentionalism trades problematic indeterminate and contradictory mental objects with innocuous indeterminate and contradictory contents.

*The third stage.* The first two stages show that having *H* is a matter of sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. This conclusion is neutral between two views on the more general property *E*, the property of having an experience with the relevant phenomenal character,

whether veridical, illusory or hallucinatory. First, *Intentionalism* holds that having *E* is always a matter of sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. By contrast, *Positive Disjunctivism* holds that having *E* is a matter of either seeing I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square) or sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. <sup>17</sup> On both views, when a person has *E* in the illusory or hallucinatory case, he has *E* by virtue of sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>, which explain his capacity to have the beliefs [19]–[21]. Thus, both views accommodate the grounding intuition. But they differ on the perfectly veridical case *V*. Intentionalism holds that, when a person has *E* in the veridical case, he again has *E* by virtue of sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square>. By contrast, Positive Disjunctivism holds that in this case he has *E* by virtue of seeing I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square). Indeed, the proponent of this view will presumably say that in the perfectly veridical case one does not sensorily entertain any content at all. The aim of the third stage is to argue for Intentionalism over Positive Disjunctivism. In my view, the usual arguments for Disjunctivism fail. And there are reasons to prefer Intentionalism to Positive Disjunctivism.

John Campbell provides an *epistemic* argument for Disjunctivism. He notes having *V* grounds the capacity to have *singular beliefs* as well as general beliefs, for instance:

[22] *That* is a red ellipse, *this* is an orange circle, and *that* is a green square.

Note that having *I* also grounds the capacity to have such a belief. The only difference is that in the case of *I* the belief will be false. But it is hard to see how this could provide an argument for Disjunctivism over Intentionalism. The Intentionalist will presumably provide the same explanation of our capacity to have singular beliefs as the Disjunctivist: in these cases we *see and attend to particular objects*. They agree—at least verbally. Why then is the explanation only successful on Disjunctivism? Campbell (2002, 117–18) defines *Naïve Realism* as the view that seeing physical objects is primitive and not analyzable according to the so-called *Conjunctive Analysis* of seeing such objects. That is to say, seeing *o* is not analyzable as the conjunction of having a certain experiential property (a property that we might also have in the case of *H*) and the holding of a causal relation of the appropriate type between this state of affairs and *o*. Campbell also seems to hold that (i) Naïve Realism is true only if Disjunctivism is true and (ii) only if Naïve Realism is true can seeing objects ground demonstrative belief. <sup>18</sup> But (ii) is unsupported. Why couldn't seeing objects ground demonstrative belief if it is analyzable in terms of causation? And (i) is false. Granted, proponents of the Common Factory Theory of phenomenal character typically defend a Conjunctive Analysis of seeing objects. But there is no entailment here. In view of the miserable record of failed attempts to provide an analysis of seeing, they might hold with the Disjunctivists that seeing objects is unanalyzable (conceptually or

otherwise) in terms of a common factor and some further condition, and so accept Naïve Realism as Campbell defines it (Johnston 2004).

Michael Martin provides an *introspective* argument for Disjunctivism. He says that Naïve Realism best articulates how sensory experience seems to us to be just though reflection (2006, 354), but he formulates Naïve Realism differently than Campbell. He makes the Aristotelian assumption that for all items, including events, there is a most specific answer to the question “what is it?”, which tells us what essentially the item is (2006, 361). This seems to be what Martin elsewhere calls the *fundamental kind* of an item. Martin (2006, note 10) refers to Wiggins (1980). I assume that he has in mind Wiggins’ notion of the *ultimate sortal* of an item, which is individuating of the item and restricts no other sortals (1980, 65). This interpretation is supported by the fact that others have used ‘fundamental kind’ for Wiggins’ notion of an ultimate sortal (Peacocke 1997). Note that the notion of a fundamental kind differs from the more familiar notion of a natural property (Lewis 1983a). An item has many natural properties but, if there are fundamental kinds, it has only one fundamental kind. It also differs from the notion of an essential property. Again, an item has many essential properties but only one fundamental kind. Martin formulates Naïve Realism along the following lines. Let  $v$  be the experiential event John undergoes when he has  $V$  on a certain occasion, and let  $h$  be the experiential event John undergoes when he has  $H$  on a certain occasion. Martin equates Naïve Realism with the view that no experiential event of the same fundamental kind as  $v$  could occur were the subject not to see mind-independent objects. Presumably, the idea is that the fundamental kind of  $v$  is something like *being an event of seeing mind-independent objects*, so that its fundamental kind differs from that of  $h$  given the reasonable assumption that in undergoing  $h$  one does not see any mind-independent objects. Since Martin equates the Common Factor Theory, or what he calls the “Common Kind Assumption”, with the view that  $v$  and  $h$  belong to the same fundamental kind, for Martin the Common Factor Theory and Naïve Realism stand in opposition. Martin suggests that we retain Naïve Realism and jettison the Common Factor Theory because this results in less of a departure from how experience seems to us through reflection.

But there are two problems. (i) I do not understand the notion of a fundamental kind. Neither Wiggins nor Martin gives any examples (although Wiggins tentatively suggests (1980, 123) that *man* might be the fundamental kind for Julius Caesar). What is the fundamental kind of a piece of dust, or the event of a piece of dust moving through the air? For this reason, it is implausible that Naïve Realism is the best articulation of how experience seems to people through reflection. And since it is very difficult to justify the claim that there are such things as fundamental kinds at all, it is very difficult to justify Naïve Realism as Martin formulates it. (ii) Even if we had reason to accept Martin’s Naïve Realism, it is not obvious to me that this would be a problem for the proponent of the Common Factor Theory, because it is not obvious to me that the proponent of the Common Factor Theory must reject the Naïve Realist’s

claim that the fundamental kind of  $v$  but not  $h$  involves seeing mind-independent objects. Granted, if the Common Factor Theory is equated with the view that the events  $v$  and  $h$  belong to the same fundamental kind, then of course he must reject this claim. But since proponents of the Common Factor Theory do not seem to have in mind a doctrine about the fundamental kinds or essences of experiential events but rather a doctrine about the nature of experiential properties, I think that the Common Factor Theory should not be equated with a view about the fundamental kinds or essences of experiential events. Rather, as I said above, it should be equated with the view that experiential properties such as  $E$  are not analyzable in terms of success states. This formulation leaves issues about the fundamental kinds and essences of experiential events open. In fact, one might even think that the proponent of a Common Factor Theory such as Intentionalism may accept Martin's Naïve Realism. On his view, when John sees a red ellipse, he has two properties: the success-involving property of seeing a red ellipse, and the neutral property of sensorily entertaining a certain content. He might naturally say that when we use an event-designator such as 'John's experience of the red ellipse' we are referring to the event which is the instantiation of the first, success-involving property: the event of John's seeing a red ellipse. And I do not see why he could not say that the fundamental kind of this event is *being an event of seeing a mind-independent object*, and that this event essentially involves a mind-independent object. In short, it seems perfectly consistent to hold that experiential *properties* are non-disjunctive but that some of the experiential *events* we undergo in the veridical cases belong to different fundamental kinds and have different essential properties than the experiential events we undergo in the hallucinatory cases.<sup>19</sup>

The usual arguments against the Common Factor Theory and Intentionalism, then, seem to me unpersuasive. There are, on the other hand, some arguments for Intentionalism and against Positive Disjunctivism. Here I will only mention two. First, Positive Disjunctivism faces a dilemma concerning the supervenience-base of the *sensorily entertaining* relation. One option for the Positive Disjunctivist would be to accept the typical type of view according to which sensorily entertaining <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is necessitated by some positive condition that is present in the case of  $V$  as well as in the case of  $I$  and  $H$ : for instance, being in a state that has a certain input-output functional profile, or having certain internal properties. But if the Positive Disjunctivist takes this option, he is forced to say that when someone has  $V$  he sensorily entertains <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> and he sees  $I$ (red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square). Since he defines  $E$  as the *disjunction* of these states, he would thereby be forced to say that in this case his having an experience with the phenomenal character definitive of  $E$  is overdetermined. This is a coherent view: if  $P$  is the disjunction of *being red* and *being round*, then a tomato's having  $P$  is similarly overdetermined. But it makes Positive Disjunctivism appear unmotivated. Another option for the Positive Disjunctivist would be to deny that sensorily entertaining contents such

as <red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square> is necessitated by some positive condition present in the case of *V* as well as the cases of *I* and *H*. For instance, he might say that a necessary condition on a subject's sensorily entertaining contents is *that he is in a bad case*. But, pending some explanation, it is hard to see how there could be such a brute, necessary constraint on sensorily entertaining contents.<sup>20</sup>

Second, normal variation in color vision creates a problem about the supervenience-base of the *instantiation-seeing relation*, which the Positive Disjunctivist uses to explain veridical phenomenology. The Positive Disjunctivist will reject any *analysis* of instantiation-seeing in terms of causation and a common factor. But it would be natural for the Positive Disjunctivist to hold that our seeing external property-instantiations such as I(red, elliptical & orange, circular & green, square) *supervenes on* a causal process leading from the external property-instantiations to our visual system (along the lines of Johnston 2004, 139 and Campbell 2002, 119). If a wizard causes you to hallucinate at random and one of your hallucinations happens to match the scene before you, you do not see any of the property-instantiations present there. But normal variation in color vision complicates the picture. If realism about color is correct, then there are actual cases of the following kind. John's visual processing and Jane's visual processing are caused by the instantiation of "unitary blue" by a certain chip: that is, a shade of blue that is not at all reddish or yellowish. In this way, the relevant color is unlike binary colors: for instance, it is unlike purple, which is reddish and bluish and so has two hue-components. (If you think the chip has multiple colors, the idea is that only this color-instantiation is causally operative in the case, so that only it is a candidate for the *seen* color-instantiation.) But, owing to postreceptoral processing differences between them that are entirely within the range of normal, Jane is put into a "binary" brain state that involves the activation of two color channels, while John is put into a "unitary" brain state that only involves the activation of one color channel. (Here I am assuming a simple opponent process model of the kind discussed in Tye 2000, but the point is independent of any model of visual processing.) In this case, while the chip looks unitary blue to John, it looks reddish-blue to Jane. Since the proponent of the type of Positive Disjunctivism under discussion holds what property-instantiations are seen determines phenomenology in the veridical case, and since John and Jane have different experiences, he cannot say that John and Jane both see the instantiation of unitary blue by the chip. (If he gives up this component of the view, and claims that they see the same property-instantiation and yet have different experiences because they see it under different internal modes of presentation, then one central motivation for his view is lost: that veridical phenomenology is entirely determined by what is "out there".) He must say that only John can see the instantiation of unitary blue by the chip. This complicates the picture because it means that the Disjunctivist cannot accept the following simple view of the supervenience-base of instantiation-seeing: necessarily, if property-instantiation *p* causes normal visual processing

in  $S$ , then  $S$  sees  $p$ . For this would falsely predict that both John and Jane see the instantiation of unitary blue by the chip. Therefore he must adopt a more complicated two-factor view: necessarily, if  $p$  causes normal visual processing in  $S$  and that visual processing “matches”  $p$ , then  $S$  sees  $p$ . How might the Disjunctivist define matching? One definition might be in terms of an “isomorphism” between external property-instantiations and internal processing. Probably no general, modality-independent definition is possible. The idea is that, as we negotiate the world, visual consciousness is just waiting to glom onto external property-instantiations. But in order for this unique mind-world relation to obtain there must be a very specific harmony between external property-instantiations and internal processing. Perhaps, then, the Disjunctivist must say that it is a rare event. I do not say that this view is impossible. But it is complicated.

In sum, the Positive Disjunctivist holds that two relations enter into the analysis of phenomenal character: sensorily entertaining and instantiation-seeing. Further, he requires implausible and complicated views regarding how they supervene on the physical. By contrast, the Intentionalist only appeals to one relation: sensorily entertaining. And he can give a simple one-factor account of how it supervenes on the physical in terms of positive conditions that are present in the veridical case as well as in the illusory and hallucinatory cases. To explain why John and Jane sensorily entertain contents involving different color properties in a case of standard variation, he might say that, although their internal states have the same color-instantiation as their *actual* cause, they have different color properties as their *optimal* causes. For myself, I believe that this view fails because of hypothetical cases where the optimal causes are stipulated to the same, but in which it is nevertheless reasonable that the individuals involved sensorily entertain contents involving different colors (Pautz forthcoming c). So I accept a one-factor theory according to which sensorily entertaining contents involving colors supervenes on internal factors alone (together perhaps with dispositions to act on the world). Of course, this is the barest sketch of an argument for Intentionalism (but see Pautz forthcoming b). But I believe that I have said enough to lend some support to my third and final thesis:

*Third Thesis:* Intentionalists have nothing to fear from the failure of the transparency argument for Intentionalism. The grounding intuition about hallucination, together with considerations about impossible and indeterminate hallucinations, forces the choice between Positive Disjunctivism and Intentionalism. But Positive Disjunctivism is an unmotivated and implausible view. So the choice is clear: we should accept Intentionalism.<sup>21</sup>

## Notes

1. It is sometimes argued that general Intentionalism fails because it is committed to a simple and mistaken analysis of the notion of veridicality (that is, the notion of perceptual success or non-deviance) in terms of the general content

- of an experience: an experience is veridical or successful iff the general content of the experience is true. Call this the *simple analysis*. As against the simple analysis, a person might have a hallucinatory experience whose purely general content is true because the ostensible scene is exactly duplicated someplace else. Mark Johnston (2006, 272) has described a different type of counterexample involving a wire-figure in which the experience is illusory or defective but the general content and even the singular content of the experience is true. He uses the case to argue for the view that in cases of successful seeing we are aware of the instantiations of properties by objects (a view to be discussed in §3). According to Johnston, the experience in his case is illusory because the subject is not aware of a certain property-instantiation. But this argument against general Intentionalism fails. The general Intentionalist claims that the general contents of our experiences determine their *phenomenal characters*, not that they determine their veridicality-conditions. So he is not committed to the simple analysis of veridicality; indeed, he is not giving an analysis of veridicality at all. There are two responses he might give to such examples. (i) In view of the difficulty in providing non-circular definitions of interesting concepts, he might refuse to give any complete analysis of the notion of veridicality or perceptual success in terms of the content of experience, awareness of property-instantiations, or anything else. (ii) He might provide an analysis other than the simple analysis. For instance, as noted in the text, he might say that experiences have general contents which determine their phenomenal characters; and, in a different sense, they have singular contents which determine their veridicality-conditions. Alternatively, he might say that one has a veridical (non-defective) experience iff the general content one sensorily entertains is true *and* it has among its witnesses objects which non-deviantly and non-accidentally cause the experience, where this second condition is not part of the content of the experience. On this analysis, the experiences in the cases mentioned are non-veridical or defective because, while the first condition is met, the second is not.
2. In fact, if Physicalism is true, the best view may be that it is determinate that one or another of these views is true, but it is indeterminate which of them is true. For we certainly bear physical relations (for instance, relations of causal covariation and indication relations) to both complex properties and general propositions (states of affairs), and it is difficult to see what naturalistic facts could make it the case that terms like ‘the state of having a red-round experience’ refer to a relation to one kind of structure rather than the other. To use the vocabulary of the supervenient approach to vagueness, the Physicalist might say that, on one acceptable precisification, such terms refer to relations to complex properties; on another, equally acceptable precisification, they refer to relations to general Russellian propositions.
  3. Byrne (2001) discusses the relationship between Intentionalism, the Sense Datum Theory, and belief in sense data. My take on this issue is that Intentionalism and *belief in the existence of sense data* are compatible, as I explained in the text. But, as I understand these doctrines, the *Sense Datum Theory* and Intentionalism are incompatible. Even a version of Intentionalism that recognizes sense data is quite different from the Sense Datum Theory. On one version of the Sense Datum Theory, having a reddish experience is identical with standing in a brute,

non-intentional “sensing relation” to a red sense datum. On another version, the *relatum* of a reddish experience is not merely a red sense datum, but the instantiation of redness by a sense datum. (This version recognizes what I will call ‘instantiation-awareness’ in §3. I mention this version because it provides a solution to a Sellarsian problem that Byrne (2001, 224–225) brings against the Sense Datum Theory.) So the proponent of the Sense Datum Theory holds that having reddish experience is a matter of being related to a sense datum, or a property-instantiation involving a sense datum. The proponent of Intentionalism who recognizes sense data has a different view: he holds that having a reddish experience is a matter of being related to a content that attributes the property of being red to some sense datum. By contrast to property-instantiations, contents are things which we can sensibly say are true or false, or instantiated or uninstantiated. So although both of these views recognize sense data, they are incompatible views concerning the constitution of phenomenal character.

4. But Smith does write, in the quoted passage, “we need to be able to *account for* the perceptual attention that may well be present in hallucination” (my italics). Perhaps, then, he *is* offering a premise in favor of his belief that hallucination has objects, namely that something like selective attention is possible even in the hallucinatory case. The next premise is that this requires Item-Awareness. On his own view, the relevant items are Meinongian objects; on another view, they are uninstantiated properties. But the opponent of Item-Awareness may say that, if statements like “Macbeth focuses on the color of the dagger” entail that there are objects of which one is aware in the hallucinatory case, then they are literally false. Of course, Macbeth’s experience changes; but the opponent may say that this is not because he stands in a greater degree of awareness to some peculiar object, but because he is related to a more detailed content (proposition or complex property) about what is before him. The opponent may add that the error is understandable, because the relevant hallucinatory experiences are just like veridical experiences in which true selective attention *does* occur. This is my own view. Of course, one might reply that the character of experience makes it obvious that such statements are literally true even in the hallucinatory case; but this rests on something like Price’s intuition. So this version of the argument appears to rest on something like Price’s intuition in the end.
5. As stated, the principle is open to obvious counterexamples. If Orcutt is a spy, and *S* is aware of Orcutt, it does not follow that *S* is justified in believing that Orcutt is a spy. For an ordinary object, awareness of the object does not entail that one has justified beliefs about all of its properties. Therefore, the defender of a Given Principle must claim that the Given Principle only holds in the case of certain types of items or types of awareness. For instance, a traditional Sense Datum theorist might say that, if *x* is a *sense datum* with property *F* (where *F* in some sense only involves the character of the sense datum), and *S* is *directly aware* of *x*, then *x* has immediate justification for believing that *x* is *F*. Likewise, the believer in Property-Awareness, such as Johnston, might hold that the Given Principle holds in the special case of the awareness of *properties*: if a property *P* has a non-relational second-order property *F*, and *S* is aware of *P*, then *S* has immediate justification for believing that *P* has *F*. But, as we shall see, there are even counterexamples to such restricted versions of the Given Principle.

6. Some would say that it is a category mistake to call the color-property purple<sub>17</sub> 70% bluish. They would claim that only objects can be bluish; properties cannot be bluish (Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 55). As against this, we do call some colors bluish to describe their hue, just as we call some colors dull to describe their brightness; and an error theory about such talk would be implausible.
7. Byrne (2003) provides an interesting argument against the claim that (in my terminology) we sensorily entertain propositions concerning the *resemblance relations* among colors. His argument is founded on the claim that it is not necessary to attribute such propositions to our experiences in order to explain our knowledge of the resemblance relations among colors. He attempts to demonstrate this with a case of the following kind: Mabel is presented with the three colors unique blue<sub>12</sub>, purple<sub>17</sub>, and unique green<sub>5</sub> consecutively, rather than all at once. Afterward, she is justified in believing that unique blue<sub>12</sub> resembles purple<sub>17</sub> more than unique green<sub>5</sub>. But this is not because she ever sensorily entertained the proposition that unique blue<sub>12</sub> resembles purple<sub>17</sub> more than unique green<sub>5</sub>: this is not plausible, according to Byrne, because there was no time at which all of these colors were presented to her simultaneously. So, whatever justifies her belief, it is not the fact that she ever sensorily entertained this proposition. Byrne then suggests that, even in the case in which the colors are presented simultaneously, it should be possible to tell a story concerning what justifies her belief concerning their resemblance-order that does not require that she ever sensorily entertained this proposition. I take Byrne's point. But Byrne's point is not at all in tension with the Intentionalist explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge about properties provided in the text. In fact, I designed the explanation so that it is compatible with Byrne's point. For this explanation does *not* claim that Mabel sensorily entertains propositions about the resemblance relations among colors. It only claims that she sensorily entertains propositions about the non-relational hue-values of colors. Thus, whoever defends this Intentionalist explanation of Mabel's *de re* knowledge would provide the following explanation of Byrne's type of case: as Mabel has her consecutive color experiences, she sensorily entertains propositions about the individual hue-values of the colors presented to her. As she has the color experiences, she knows their individual hue-values. After she is presented with all three colors, she is able to use this knowledge to work out their resemble-order. Compare seeing three faces consecutively and afterwards using memory to work out their resemblance-order.
8. Although [11] does not itself have the form 'There is something such that it is *F* and it is not that the case that it is *F*', one might think that it entails something of this form, namely 'There is something such that it moves and it is not that the case that it moves'. To avoid this entailment, the sense datum theorist might deny the schema 'For all *x*, if *x* stands still, then it is not the case that *x* moves'. Typically, Meinongians deny such inferences to avoid violating logic. For instance, they hold that round squares do not contravene logic because 'For all *x*, if *x* is round, then it is not the case that *x* is square' is not true if the quantifier ranges over all that there is. It is not clear why the sense datum theorist could not deny such inferences also.
9. Smith often seems to suggest that 'there is an *F* Meinongian object of which *S* is aware' means something like 'it perceptually seems to *S* that something is *F*',

which does not contain a quantifier even at the level of deep structure (except within the scope of the ‘it perceptually seems that’ operator). Talk of Meinongian objects just is talk of the character of experience. As he puts it, “The intentional object is not any sort of being “over and above” the experience itself” (2002, 243). It may be thought that this “counterfeit Meinongianism” would allow a distinct reply to the problem of indeterminate and contradictory experiences than the one that Smith actually offers. If we stipulate that ‘there is a Meinongian object of which Maxwell is aware that moves and stands still’ simply means something along the lines of ‘it perceptually seems to Maxwell that there is something that moves and stands still’, then, since the latter sentence violates no intuitions, the former sentence (on the stipulated reading) also violates no intuitions. But I am not concerned with Smith’s view under this interpretation, for two reasons. First, there is a reason why I have called it ‘counterfeit Meinongianism’. This view is not really a Meinongian view as I define ‘Meinongian view’. On my formulation, a Meinongian accepts the proposition that there are things that do not exist, where ‘there are’ expresses *genuine quantification*. The defender of the view described above does not accept this proposition. The relevant occurrences of ‘there are’ in his mouth do not express genuine quantification. This is shown by the fact that when he says ‘there are things that Maxwell hallucinates’ he takes this sentence to be analytically equivalent to a sentence that does not contain a genuine quantifier (except within the scope of ‘it perceptually seems to Maxwell that’). Consider some analogies. A compositional nihilist who allows that ‘there are tables’ is true because there are atoms arranged table-wise is not using ‘there are’ for genuine quantification. A philosopher who uses ‘There is a red sense datum that John perceives and that belongs to the apple’ as shorthand for ‘the apple looks red to John’ does not use ‘there are’ for genuine quantification. Second, the counterfeit Meinongianism is not a *theory of the nature of experience*. It is not a theory at all. Instead, it is just a way of talking about experiences that may be adopted by anyone no matter what his theoretical allegiances.

10. There are two other versions of the view that the objects of hallucination are particulars. First, there is the view that the objects of hallucination are sets of *possibilia* related by a suitable relation of perceptual cross-world identification (Lewis 1983b, 12). The main problem with this view is that it requires *possibilia*. One might think that it could be defended in an ersatzist form; but apparently this cannot be done (Lewis 1983b, 23). Second, there is the *abstract objects view*. Whereas on the Meinongian view the objects of hallucination are non-existent objects that literally have or instantiate the apparent properties, on this view they are existing abstract objects that are merely *depicted as having* the apparent properties (Salmon 2002). But this view is open to three objections. First, I think it would be a mistake to think that, since on this view the objects of hallucination are merely depicted as having the contradictory and merely determinable properties, it necessarily avoids the intuitive objection. If on this view ‘There is something that moves and stands still’ expresses something true (e. g. that there is an abstract object that is depicted as moving and standing still), it is open to the same objection: intuitively, this sentence is not true and indeed what it expresses could not be true, so a good semantic theory will

assign it a necessarily false proposition. Second, it is ontologically inflationary. Third, it is open to the same objection that I will raise against *universals* as the objects of hallucination: if such abstract objects are not extended or located, I do not see how they may be things of which we are visually aware. Perhaps we may *think of* such things; but we cannot *see* them. It may be said that I have only focused on the case against non-existent or non-actual objects as the objects of hallucination, and that there is also a case for them: namely, that we occasionally utter sentences which, at least according to the simplest semantic account of them, require such objects. For instance, William Lycan says that when you have a hallucination of pink rats it is uncontroversial that ‘the pinkness is the color of the non-existent rats’ (2001, 19) and that there is some sense in which ‘there are things that do not exist’ (2001, note 4). There is also Geach’s Hob/Nob sentence (Salmon 2002). This is just an instance of the type of semantic argument discussed in §3. This argument seems weak to me because it succeeds only if (i) the right account of such sentences is the simplest “face-value” semantics suggested by surface form and (ii) such sentences are literally true. One or the other of these assumptions might be reasonably denied.

11. I agree with Johnston (2004, note 27) that, *strictly speaking*, acceptance of Property-Awareness could be combined with the rejection of uninstantiated properties: it may be combined with the claim that a property exists if and only if it is instantiated. But while such a view is possible, it is not very plausible, because it yields a strange form of externalism: in order to be aware of  $\text{red}_{17}$ ,  $\text{red}_{17}$  must be instantiated someplace. For this reason, a plausible version of the theory requires that all the relevant shades exist, waiting to be objects of awareness, even if they are not instantiated.
12. Some comments on this intuition. (i) It would be a mistake to think that the general intuition is accommodated by Disjunctivism (to be discussed in §6). For Disjunctivists deny that having a *hallucinatory* experience with a certain phenomenal character is a matter of being related an extended object. The general intuition is only accommodated by the Sense Datum Theory. (ii) The intuition is illustrated by the fact that the Sense Datum Theory provides a much more intuitive solution to the Many-Property Problem than Intentionalism. On the Sense Datum Theory, the difference between a hallucination of a red thing to the left of a green thing, on the one hand, and a hallucination of a green thing to the left of a red thing, on the other, is grounded in the difference between the spatial locations of the objects of which the subject is aware in having the hallucinations. Intentionalism offers a quite different solution. On general Russellian Intentionalism, the two hallucinatory states differ because the first hallucination consists in a relation to  $\exists x \exists y (x \text{ is red and } y \text{ is green and } x \text{ is the left of } y)$  while the second hallucination consist in a relation to  $\exists x \exists y (x \text{ is green and } y \text{ is red and } x \text{ is the left of } y)$ . Formally, this solves the problem, but it quite counterintuitive. For notice that these propositions are composed of the same properties. Perhaps they differ in respect of non-spatial structure: for instance, set-theoretic structure. This raises a problem: since there are multiple set-theoretic constructions of a given proposition, what set-theoretic construction might the proposition be? But there is a deeper problem: how could the difference in the experiences consist in some arcane difference in

the non-spatial structures of the *relata* of the experiences? A similar intuitive problem attends the solution to the Many-Property Problem offered by the Property-Complex Theorist. (iii) The intuitive problem has nothing to do with the debate over Physicalism and Dualism. It also applies against a Dualist version of Intentionalism (Chalmers 2006). Intuitively, having a visual experience with a certain character cannot consist in standing in *any* relation, whether physical or primitive, to a non-extended content. Thus the intuitive problem arises because, on Intentionalism, the *relata* of sensory consciousness are non-extended. And this is true even on a Dualist version of Intentionalism. That the problem applies equally to a Dualist version of Intentionalism is illustrated by the conceivability of a certain type of scenario. Consider a system that is not only physically like a person who has a reddish experience, but that also bears a primitive relation of sensorily entertaining to the same non-extended item in Plato's heaven. On the combination of Dualism and Intentionalism, necessarily, every such system also has a reddish experience; but it seems that we can imagine a system that has these properties but does not have a reddish experience—a kind of Super-Zombie. As a result, it seems that the proponent of the Conceivability Argument for Dualism cannot accept Intentionalism, for the Conceivability Argument generalizes and also applies against Intentionalism. Indeed, the defender of the Conceivability Argument for Dualism cannot accept any “deep” theory of experience (even a deep Dualistic theory such as Dualistic Intentionalism), because it will always be possible to imagine a case in which the relevant deep facts are present but in which experience is absent.

13. Perhaps it will be said that the result here, that we cannot be said to be *aware of* properties, is not significant, because the Intentionalist may simply use a technical expression: for instance, he may say that we *visually represent* properties or that we are *aware'* of them. This is a mistake, for two reasons. First, the result means that Price's intuition, that there are items that we *see* or are *aware of* even in the hallucinatory case, is false. This result is significant even though it may yet be true that in hallucination we are *aware'* of properties. For Price's intuition is extremely compelling. Consider an analogy. Suppose that it were shown that no one *knows* anything. This result is significant even though it may yet be true that people *know'* some things, where this is some technical concept quite distinct from the concept of knowledge with weaker conditions of application. For the commonsense belief that we know things is central to our way of thinking about the world. Second, as we will see in the next section, the falsity of Price's intuition has important consequences for the transparency argument for Intentionalism.
14. Martin (1998) addresses the problem for [14] posed by hallucination. However, he does not explicitly offer a revised transparency thesis that escapes the problem, one that could be used as a premise in an argument for Intentionalism. He does write, in response to the problem, “in as much as an hallucination may be indistinguishable for one from a genuine perception, it will still seem to one as if there is an array of objects there for one to scan and explore” (1998, 17). This suggests a revised transparency thesis [14a]: Whenever someone knows what her experience is like, then it *seems to her* that there is an array of objects for her to scan and explore. But, while [14a] may be true, it is not substantive: it may be accepted by everyone. Even the Adverbialist, who is Martin's target, agrees

that whenever someone knows what her experience is like it *seems* to her that there are objects that she is attending to. Martin also speaks of attending to “putative” objects in hallucination (1998, 18). This suggests [14b]: Whenever someone knows what her experience is like, there are some “putative objects” that she experiences and she knows what her experience is like by attending to these “putative objects”. Since ‘*S* attends to *a*’ entails ‘there is something that *S* attends to’, [14b] brings with it a commitment to the claim that there are “putative objects”. Martin does not explain what these are supposed to be. Maybe he has in mind Meinongian objects. In any case, since [14b] as well as [14] brings with it commitment to the claim that when one hallucinates there are objects one attends to, it is difficult to justify and so would not be a suitable premise in an argument against Adverbialism or for Intentionalism.

15. Consider, for instance, the following transparency thesis: one knows what one’s experience is like by knowing a truth of the form *something looks F to one*. This transparency thesis may be accepted by any theorist. Different theorists will simply provide different analyses of ‘something looks *F* to *S*’. Yet another transparency thesis is as follows: If someone knows what her experience is like, she knows this by knowing some claim of the form *it seems to her that p*, where the *p* is a claim about external objects. But this thesis is false. As Jackson (1977) persuasively argues, ‘it seems to me that *p*’ is doxastic: it concerns what one is inclined to believe or would be justified in believing on the basis of experience. It is implausible to know that one knows what one’s experience is like by knowing what one is disposed to believe. One might say that one is not using ‘seems’ in its ordinary sense here, but in some technical sense; but until this alleged technical sense is explained we do not have a genuine thesis on the table.
16. And of course not seeing any external objects—a qualification I will leave understood in what follows.
17. There are different versions of Positive Disjunctivism, but I will focus on this version.
18. Campbell seems to hold (i) because he introduces Naïve Realism in the context of characterizing Disjunctivism. He seems to hold (ii) because he writes (2002, 114) that “simple acquaintance with [an] object” is the type of relation to an object that provides “knowledge of the reference of a simple demonstrative”. I should mention that Campbell does not endorse Positive Disjunctivism. Neither does Michael Martin, who will be discussed below. But I am considering their arguments for Disjunctivism in general. These arguments could be used to support the choice of Positive Disjunctivism over Intentionalism.
19. Two further remarks. (i) Although I do not think that there is any reason to accept Martin’s fundamental kind claim, I do think (contrary to Byrne and Logue forthcoming) that there is some intuitive reason to accept another claim Martin makes, which does not invoke the dubious notion of the fundamental kind of an item but the notion of an essential property of an item: namely, that one of the essential properties of *v* is that it has mind-independent constituents, an essential property that *h* evidently does not possess (Martin 2006, 357). But a version of my second criticism still applies: the Common Factor Theory is not a theory about the essential properties of experiential events, to the effect that *v* and *h* have the same essential properties, but a theory about the nature of experiential

properties such as *E*, to the effect that they are not analyzable (disjunctively or otherwise) in terms of success states. For the reason given in the text, I do not see why the Common Factor Theorist cannot say that some of the *events* we undergo in the veridical cases (such as the world-involving event of seeing a red ellipse) have different essential properties than the experiential events we undergo in the hallucinatory cases, and in particular, that they essentially involve mind-independent objects. So I do not see why he cannot agree with the intuition. (ii) I also feel the pull of the intuition that the property of having an experience with a certain phenomenal character (a property that a person may have in hallucinatory cases as well as veridical and illusory cases) can only be identical with the property of being related to some extended object or objects. Maybe this is the intuition that Disjunctivists are trying to capture. But, as I mentioned in note 12, Disjunctivism does not accommodate this general intuition. It is only the Sense Datum Theory that does so. Of course, it accommodates the intuition that, when one has *E* in a *veridical* case, one has *E* by virtue of being related to extended objects. But it rejects the parallel intuition about the hallucinatory case. Once we reject the intuition in the hallucinatory case, it seems we have very good reason to doubt the intuition in the veridical case.

20. But if he accepts an Interpretationist Theory of sensory content (Lewis 1983a), perhaps the Positive Disjunctivist will give the following explanation: since success states are enough to explain an individual's beliefs and behavior in the veridical cases, the "best interpretation" of the individual will not posit a propositional attitude more basic belief to explain his beliefs and behaviors in such cases. But since these success states are lacking in the non-veridical cases, the best interpretation will posit such a propositional attitude to explain his beliefs (for instance, [19]–[21]) and behaviors in such cases. But I think that this explanation fails. For one thing, I believe that an Interpretation Theory of sensory content is mistaken (Pautz forthcoming c).
21. This material was presented at the Friday Forum at New York University in 2002 and at the Australian National University in 2005. Thanks to John Bengson, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Daniel Stoljar, Christopher Peacocke, and Nico Silins for help. Thanks also to those who took part my Perception seminar at the University of Texas in Spring 2006.

## References

- Armstrong, D. (1989) *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bealer, G. (1982) *Quality and Concept*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Block, N. (forthcoming) "Functional Reduction", in T. Horgan, M. Sabates, and D. Sosa (eds.) *Supervenience in Mind*.
- Byrne, A. (2001) "Intentionalism Defended". *Philosophical Review* 110: 199–240.
- Byrne, A. (2003) "Color and Similarity". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66: 641–65.
- Byrne, A. and D. Hilbert (2003) "Color Realism Redux". *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 52–63.
- Byrne, A. and H. Logue (forthcoming) "Disjunctivism", in A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.) *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, J. (2002) *Reference and Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Chalmers, D. (2006) "Perception and the Fall from Eden", in T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crane, T. (2001) *Elements of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dretske, F. (1995) *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Dretske, F. (1999) "The Mind's Awareness of Itself". *Philosophical Studies* 95: 103–124.
- Evans, G. (1982) *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Forrest, P. (2005) "Universals as Sense Data". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71: 622–31.
- Foster, J. (2000) *The Nature of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hawthorne, J. and K. Kovakovich (2006) "Disjunctivism". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* supp. vol. 80: 145–83.
- Jackson, F. (1977) *Perception: A Representative Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, M. (2004) "The Obscure Object of Hallucination". *Philosophical Studies* 120: 113–183.
- Johnston, M. (2006) "Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness", in T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, D. (1983a) "New Work for a Theory of Universals". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61: 343–77.
- Lewis, D. (1983b) "Individuation by Acquaintance and by Description". *Philosophical Review* 92: 3–32.
- Lewis, D. (1986) "Against Structural Universals". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 64: 25–46.
- Lycan, W. (2001) "The Case for Phenomenal Externalism", in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 15: Metaphysics, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.
- Martin, M. (1998) "Setting Things Before the Mind", in A. O'Hear (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, M. (2006) "On Being Alienated", in T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McLaughlin, B. (forthcoming) "Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness", in M. Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness*, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. (1999) "The Appearance of Colour", in *Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- McGinn, C. (2004) "The Objects of Intentionality", in *Consciousness and Its Objects*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Moore, G. E. (1903) "The Refutation of Idealism". *Mind* 12: 433–53.
- Pautz, A. (forthcoming a) "Intentionalism and the Notion of the Content of an Experience".
- Pautz, A. (forthcoming b) "The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality. *The Monist*".
- Pautz, A. (forthcoming c) "A Simple View of Consciousness", forthcoming in G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds.), *The Waning of Materialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peacocke, C. (1997) "Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology". *Mind* 106: 521–74.
- Price, H. H. (1932) *Perception*. London: Methuen.
- Sainsbury, M. (2005) *Reference without Referents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salmon, N. (2002) "Mythical Objects", in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke and D. Shier (eds), *Meaning and Truth*, New York: Seven Bridges Press: 105–123.
- Sanford, D. (1981) "Illusions and Sense Data", in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press: 371–386.
- Siegel, S. (2006) "The Contents of Perception", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/perception-contents/>>.

Smith, A. D. (2002) *The Problem of Perception*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tye, M. (2000) *Consciousness, Color and Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tye, M. (2005) "In Defense of Representationalism: Reply to Commentaries", in Murat Aydede (ed.), *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tye, M. (2006) "Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain", in T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiggins, D. (1980) *Sameness and Substance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Williamson, T. (2000) *Knowledge and Its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.