

**CURRICULUM VITAE**  
**ADAM PAUTZ**

Department of Philosophy  
Brown University  
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**EDUCATION**

New York University  
Ph.D. Philosophy. 2004. Dissertation Title: *The Hard Core of the Mind-Body Problem*.  
Dissertation Supervisor: Ned Block.

The University of Minnesota  
B.A. in Psychology, B. A. in Philosophy. *Summa Cum Laude*. 1998. Thesis Title:  
*Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence*. Thesis supervisor: Joseph  
Owens.

**EMPLOYMENT**

Full Professor, Department of Philosophy, Brown University. 2015-

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2012-  
2015.

Research Fellow, Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian  
National University. January-June 2012.

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. 2004-  
2011.

Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre for Consciousness. Department of Philosophy, Australian  
National University. 2004-2005 and 2006-2007.

**AREAS**

Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics  
Areas of Competence: Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

**PUBLICATIONS**

(For links to my recent and forthcoming papers, as well as to publications by others addressing my work, please see my website <http://www.brown.edu/academics/philosophy/adam-pautz> )

“Comments on Siegel, *The Rationality of Perception*.”

Forthcoming *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

“The Perception of Objects and of Natural Kinds”

Forthcoming *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

“Comments on Anil Gupta”

forthcoming in *Analytic Philosophy*

“How Does Color Experience Represent the World?”

Forthcoming in D. Brown and F. Macpherson (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour*. (full draft completed)

“How Can Brains In Vats Experience Space? A Puzzle for Internalists”.

Forthcoming in A. Pautz and D. Stoljar (eds.) *Themes from Block*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (final draft completed)

“Propositions and Complex Properties”.

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2016. With a reply by Merricks.

“Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument?”

In B. Nanay (ed.) *Current Debates in Philosophy of Perception*. 2016.

“What is My Evidence that Here is a Cup?”

*Philosophical Studies* 173: 915–927. 2016.

“The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism”.

In Kallestrup and Sprevak (eds.) *New Waves in Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 153-85. Palgrave. 2013.

“Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs?” *Philosophical Studies* 163:

25-36. 2013.

“The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: The Science of Pain, Taste and Smell”.

In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 237-298. Springer. 2013.

“Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and

Klein”. In Brown (ed.) *Consciousness Inside and Out*, pp. 307-317. Springer. 2013.

“Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?”

In Kriegel (ed.) *Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays*, pp. 194-234. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013.

“Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?”  
*Philosophical Issues* 21: 384-333. 2011.

“Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?”  
*Philosophical Issues* 20: 333-367. 2010.

“Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?”  
In B. Nanay (ed.) *Perceiving the World*, pp. 254-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010.

“A Simple View of Consciousness.”  
In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds.) *The Waning of Materialism*, pp. 25-67. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in 2010.

“Philosophical Theories of Colour.”  
In T. Bayne (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness*, pp. 144-149. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in 2009.

“What Are the Contents of Experiences?”  
*The Philosophical Quarterly* 59: 483-507. Published in 2009.  
Reprinted in MacPherson and Hawley (eds.) *The Admissible Contents of Experiences*: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

“An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics.”  
*Philosophical Studies* 138: 335-347. 2008.

“The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.”  
*The Monist* 91: 250-272. 2008.

“Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.”  
*Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 495-541. 2007.

“Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism.”  
*Noûs* 40: 205-240. Published in 2006.

“Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in terms of Colour Experience?”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83: 535-564. 2006.

“Byrne and Hilbert on the Unitary-Binary Structure of the Color.”  
*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 44-45. 2003.

“An Argument against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals.”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75: 109-111. 1997.

## Reviews

“Review of Hill’s *Consciousness*.”  
*Analysis* 71: 294-297. 2011.

“Review of Cohen’s *The Red and The Real*.” *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.  
2010.

“Review of Langsam’s *The Wonder of Consciousness*.” *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. 2014.

## Books

*Perception: How Mind Connects to World*

New York, NY: Routledge Press. Accepted: invited by Routledge to submit proposal; advanced contract offered on the basis of the proposal. *Full draft completed*.

*Themes from Block*.

A collection devoted to the work of Ned Block. Edited by myself and Daniel Stoljar. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.

## In preparation

“Does Russellian Monism Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” *Full draft completed*.

“On Being Present to the Mind: A New Case for the Irreducibility of Consciousness”.  
*Full Draft completed*.

“Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?” *Full draft completed*.

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?” *In Preparation*.

*The Emergent Mind: New Problems for Materialists and How to Solve Them*  
To be submitted to Oxford University Press. *In Preparation*.

## PRESENTATIONS

Comments on Siegel, Author Meets Critics, *The Rationality of Perception*

TBD. Conference on Russellian Monism: Time for the Details. Saturday the 12th to Sunday the 13<sup>th</sup>. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?”  
Institut Jean Nicod. Workshop organized by Uriah Kriegel and John Morrison

“Being Present to the Mind: A New Case for the Irreducibility of Consciousness”  
Cambridge New Directions Project. Summer 2017

“Could Consciousness be the Source of Intentionality?”  
“Being Present to the Mind: A New Case for the Irreducibility of Consciousness”  
“How Does Color Experience Represent the World?”  
Leeds. Summer 2017

“Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?”  
Conference on sensible qualities. UC Berkeley. Spring 2017.

“Does Science Undermine Naïve Realism?”  
Conference on color primitivism, organized by Derek Brown, Spring 2017.

“Comments on Speaks, *The Phenomenal and the Representational*”  
Central APA, 2017

“Are Sensory Qualities in the Head or In the World?” Presentation at Brown Institute  
for Brain Science

Commentator at “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”  
University of Pittsburgh. October 21, 2016.

Discussion of my book MS, *Perception*. Columbia University.

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”, Yale.

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Cambridge New Directions Project

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 CUNY

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Southern Methodist University

“A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness”  
2016 Metaphysics at the Ranch

“Are Colors out There? Comments on Chirimuuta’s *Outside Color*”  
2016 Pacific APA

“Does Science Support Internalism about Experience?”  
2015 Pacific APA. Invited Paper, with Geoff Lee and Casey O’Callaghan as commenters

“The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists: Some Empirical Puzzles”  
Spring 2015, Michigan

“What is Inquiry? Comments on Jane Friedman”  
2015 Metaphysics at the Ranch

“The Price of Internalism about Experience”  
Fall 2014. Brown, Philosophy Department Colloquium Series

“The Price of Internalism about Experience”  
Fall 2014. University of Southern California, Philosophy Department Colloquium Series

“The Puzzle of Personites: Comments on Mark Johnston”  
2014 Pacific APA

“The Content View vs. the Object View of Experience”  
Author Meets Critics, 2014 Central APA

“Consciousness as the Source of Rationality and Thought”  
Rice, Conference on Perception and Thought, 2013

“Could Consciousness be a Brain Process? A New Argument Against Type-Type Identity”  
Jowett Society Oxford, 2013

Comments on the Contents of Experience  
Pacific APA 2013

Comments on Susanna Schellenberg  
Central APA 2013

“Phenomenal Externalism”  
Australian National University. Seminar. 2012.

“Is Consciousness Just in the Head?”  
The University of Western Australia. Consciousness Conference. 2012.

“Epistemic Troubles for Naïve Realists”  
The Australian National University. Mind and Epistemology Conference. 2012.

- “Do the Benefits of Naïve Realist Outweigh the Costs?”  
Seattle, Washington. Invited commentary on Disjunctivism about Experience. Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. 2012.
- “Could Consciousness Just be a Brain Process?”  
University of California at Berkeley. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2011.
- “Against Phenomenal Externalism.”  
Columbia University. Perception Conference. 2011.
- “Experiencing *Abstracta*?”  
University of Texas at Austin. Graduate Student Conference. 2011.
- “The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: The Science of Pain, Taste and Smell.”  
Consciousness Online Conference III. 2011.
- “How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?”  
University of California at San Diego. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2011.
- “Retentionalist vs Extensionalist Theories of Time Consciousness.”  
Harvard University. Time Consciousness Conference. 2010.
- “Is Experience Predicational?”  
New York University. Conference on the Predicational Structure of Experience. 2010.
- “How Do Sensible Properties Become Present to the Mind?”  
Rutgers University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010.
- “Disjunctivism and Knowledge of Color.”  
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Conference on Color Perception and Color Language. 2010.
- “Epistemological Arguments Against Disjunctivism.”  
Columbia University. New Directions in the Philosophy of Perception. 2010.
- “Why Consciousness Can’t Just be in the Head.”  
Cornell University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2010
- “Why Consciousness Can’t Just be in the Head.”  
Consciousness Online Conference II. 2010.
- “Tastes, Pains, and Sounds: New Problems for Naturalizing Consciousness.”  
Lund University, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden’s National Philosophy Conference). 2009.

- “Yuck and Yum: New Puzzles for Intentionalism.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. *The Waning of Materialism* Workshop. 2009.
- “The Content of Color Experience and the Light View of Color.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2008.
- “An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience.”  
Syracuse University. Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network. 2008.
- “An Argument for the Intentional View of Experience”  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.
- “Is the External World Colored?”  
Umea University, Sweden. Lecture to the Philosophy Department. 2008.
- “What are Colors?”  
Umea University, Sweden. Public Lecture. 2008.
- “An Argument Against the Identity Theory of Experience.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. Understanding and Illusion Workshop. 2008.
- “The Case for Intentionalism about Sensory Consciousness.”  
Merida, Mexico. UTexas/UNAM Conference. 2007.
- “The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality.”  
The Australian National University. Phenomenology and Intentionality Workshop Conference. 2007.
- “Intentionalism and the Admissible Contents of Experience.”  
The University of Glasgow. Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience. 2007.
- “The Intentional View of Sensory Consciousness.”  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2007.
- “Why Believe that Experiences have Contents?”  
The University of Western Australia. Consciousness and Representation Conference. 2007.
- “Intentionalism and Non-Visual Modalities.”  
Kioloa Australia Conference on Consciousness. 2006.
- “Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?”  
Canberra, Australia. Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. 2006.

“Can Intentionalists be Reductionists?”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

“Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

“Modesty versus Immodesty about the Role of Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception: Comments on Hellie.”  
Online Philosophy Conference. 2006.

“Intentionalism and the Laws of Appearance.”  
New York, NY. Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Society. 2006.

“Does Intentionalism Really Accommodate the Transparency Observation?”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

“A Critique of Realist Primitivism about the Colors.”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

“Can Colour Structure be Explained in terms of Colour Experience?”  
Australian National University. Philosophy Department Colloquium Series. 2005.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
Australian National University. Inaugural Lecture for the Centre for Consciousness. 2004.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Texas at Austin. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Michigan. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Colorado at Boulder. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Arizona. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 2003.

“The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
The University of Iowa. 2003.

“The Mind-Body Problem for Intentionalists.”  
Linköping, Sweden. Filosofidagarna (Sweden’s National Philosophy Conference).  
2003.

“Representationalism and Phenomenal-Neural Dependence.”  
Tufts University. New England Undergraduate Conference. 1998.

## **ADVISING**

### **As Supervisor for Honors Theses**

Ian Jacobson. In Defense of Representationalism. Current.

Paul Dumond. Panpsychism. 2012.

Isaac Neeley. Experience. 2011.

Thomas Wald. *In Defense of A Priori Physicalism*. 2009.

Aisha Ellahi. *Consciousness and the Human Brain: Explaining the “Ghost Stuff” in Our Heads*. 2007.

### **As Chair of Dissertation Committees**

Brian Cutter. In progress.

Tomas Bogardus. *An Epistemological Approach to the Mind-Body Problem*. 2011.

David Ivy. *Disentangling Disjunctivism*. Current.

### **As Member of Dissertation Committees**

Leah Lasell Ph.D.

John Bengson Ph.D.

Briggs Wright Ph.D.

Steven James Ph.D.

Enrico Grube Ph.D.

Alex Grzankowski Ph.D.

Kevin Smith Ph.D.

Derek Anderson Ph.D.

Fatema Amijee Ph.D.

Lance Balthazar Ph.D.

Brian Cutter Phd. D.

## **SERVICE**

### **To the profession:**

Organizer of the New York University Mind and Language Colloquium. 1999-2003.

Outside Referee for David Bourget's Doctoral Dissertation at the Australian National University, *The Representational Theory of Consciousness*. (20 page report)

Referee for *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

Referee for *Noûs*.

Referee for *Mind and Language*.

Referee for *Synthese*.

Referee for *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*.

Referee for *Thought*.

Referee for *Philosopher's Imprint*.

Referee for *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Referee for *Philosophical Review*.

Referee for *Philosophical Studies*.

Referee for books for Oxford University Press (multiple times).

### **To the university of Texas at Austin:**

2005-2006. Colloquy. New Chair Committee.

2007-2008. Curriculum.

2008-2009. Research. Cogburn Essay Competition Judge. Undergraduate Essay Competition Judge.

2009-2010. Research. Cogburn Essay Competition Judge.

2010-2014. Colloquy.

## **AWARDS**

University of Texas Summer Research Award, 2006.

James Arthur Fellowship, 2003-2004.

Frankel Fellowship, 2002-2003. Awarded by the New York University Department of Philosophy to one fifth year student.

## **RESEARCH DESCRIPTION**

My work has focused mostly on four inter-related issues: (1) perception, (2) the program of naturalizing consciousness and its intentionality, (3) the status of the sensible qualities, and (4) the role of consciousness in grounding intentionality. My work on these issues is systematic and develops a distinctive, empirically-informed approach to consciousness and intentionality. I take what I call a “consciousness-first” approach: phenomenal consciousness is not something that can be reductively explained in other terms (e. g. tracking plus cognitive/rational accessibility), but rather a starting point from which to explain other things (e. g. cognition, rationality, value).

Here I sketch my work to date with broad strokes. (More detailed descriptions may be found on my UTexas website. Links to publications by others discussing my work may also be found there.)

### **(1) Perception.**

At the center of my work is a commitment to an intentionalist (or “representationalist”) approach to our consciousness of the external world. Roughly, on this view, to have a (veridical or hallucinatory) experience of a tomato is to form a special, very detailed representation of a red item of a round and somewhat bulgy shape. The phenomenal character of the experience is constituted by its intentional content. The main rival is “naïve realism”. On this radically externalist view, experience doesn’t involve representation at all. In the veridical case, the phenomenal character of your experience is just determined by what states in the external world you are directly acquainted with. Of course, the same account cannot be applied to non-veridical experience, so naïve realism leads to a kind of

“disjunctivism”. Intentionalism and naïve realism have been applied to all sorts of experiences, not only visual experiences. The issues here have important consequences for the mind-body problem and epistemology.

My argument for intentionalism, which I develop in a series of essays, is unique in that it takes the form of an inference to the best explanation, one taking into account empirical considerations as well as *a priori* ones. Both veridical and non-veridical experiences can ground the capacity to have beliefs about the external world. Visual experiences, like standard intentional states, can be indeterminate and depict impossible scenarios. Further, contemporary neuroscience and psychophysics show that the brain makes a big contribution to what our experience of the world is like. The intentionalist conception of experience simply fits these facts better than rivals such as “naïve realism”.

## **(2) The program of naturalizing consciousness and its intentionality.**

Once intentionalism is accepted, the hard problem of reducing phenomenal consciousness becomes a special case of the equally hard problem of reducing intentionality, the problem of explaining how aboutness reduces to the pattern of physical and functional facts. Where in the physical world should we locate the sensible qualities, like colors, sounds, and smells? And how does an experience manage to become intentionally directed at sensible qualities? If the program of reducing intentionality fails, we are apparently stuck with a complex view of the mind in the world, one requiring “danglers” connecting the physical with the intentional.

Many (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske, Lycan, Hill, Byrne) think intentionalism facilitates the reduction of phenomenal consciousness. They identify the sensible qualities – colors, smells, tastes, pain-qualities, and so on – with complex, objective physical properties of external things or bodily regions. Then they invoke one or another of the many existing externalist naturalistic theories of intentionality (causal-covariation theory, asymmetric-dependence theory, teleological theory) to explain how we manage to represent these qualities in experience.

This yields one of the most revolutionary ideas of recent philosophy of mind, phenomenal externalism: the view that phenomenal consciousness, like meaning, “just ain’t in the head”. What fixes phenomenology is not what goes on in the head, but what external properties are tracked by what goes on in the head. So a lone, life-long brain in a vat couldn’t support phenomenal consciousness. And internally identical brains, in different environments, can support different experiences of the world, if they track different ranges of external properties. In short, the brain doesn’t make a big contribution to phenomenology. The function of the brain is just to reveal the world to us. It’s not just intentionalists who go in for phenomenal externalism. Contemporary “naïve realists” also advocate the idea.

I think the phenomenal externalists have taken externalism in the philosophy of mind too far. I favor intentionalism, but I reject externalist versions of it. My problem with phenomenal externalism is not based on intuitions involving the usual far out thought-experiments: the brain in the vat, spectrum inversion, or inverted earth. Indeed I have recently developed new problems with such

arguments. Instead, in my work, I develop an argument based on contemporary neuroscience, especially new work in neuroscience using multivariate techniques. This work shows that the pattern of resemblances among experiences in many sense-modalities, the distinction between experiences of pure colors and “mixed” colors, and many other aspects of phenomenology have a clear basis in the brain. The brain does make a big contribution to phenomenology, in a way I show to be incompatible with the views promoted by the phenomenal externalists.

So our standard externalist models for reducing intentionality simply do not apply to the intentionality of phenomenal consciousness. In my work I also develop a novel argument showing that there also can be no good *reductive internalist* approach to the intentionality of consciousness. The argument depends on the idea that all having experience involves standing a “conscious-of” relation to *properties* (akin to Russell’s “acquaintance” relation). The result is a systematic argument that when it comes to the intentionality of phenomenal consciousness the “naturalization program” is stymied. We should accept intentionalism about consciousness, but reject the reductive aspirations that often go with it. The “conscious-of” relation is irreducible, even if it may be grounded in physical conditions. At least when it comes to the intentionality of consciousness, I agree with one of Putnam’s slogans: “intentionality can’t be reduced and won’t go away”.

I suggest that it is time to face up to the failure of the program of “naturalizing” consciousness and its intentionality, and to get on with the business of developing a *positive non-reductive theory*. On my view, being conscious of an array of qualities at various locations cannot be reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The best we can do is show that such states supervene on the biology of the brain in a systematic way. Recent research in neuroscience (e. g. research on “decoding”) is beginning to uncover systematic dependencies of this kind.

I call the resulting view *biological intentionalism*. In accordance with intentionalism, experience is a matter of representing the world as containing things with various qualities. But, contrary to received wisdom, the phenomenal content of sensory experience is fixed by the biology of the brain, not causal connections to the outside world. (Of course, causal relations to the environment, together with descriptive fit, help fix what particular objects you see. My view is only that the biology of the brain fixes those aspects of the content of experience that constitute phenomenology.)

My anti-reductionism about consciousness and its intentionality, I argue, has an important consequence for the mind-body problem, namely, that we ought to adopt a kind of agnosticism about whether consciousness supervenes on the physical with metaphysical necessity (physicalists) or mere nomic necessity (dualists). Yet I also regard my view to be compatible with a sensible naturalism. As Mark Johnston has recently argued, anti-reductionism about consciousness and its intentionality is quite compatible with a proper respect for the sciences of nature and their ambition to a certain kind of causal completeness in their description of the world.

### **(3) The Sensible Qualities.**

The traditional 17th century Galilean “projectivist” view holds that the sensible qualities are really in the mind or brain. But a recent trend is to try to kick the sensible qualities back down into the mind-independent physical world. As I mentioned, this reductive objectivist view is taken by the “phenomenal externalists” discussed above. It is also the view of all contemporary “disjunctivists” and “naïve realists”. There is also a kind of middle way: Sydney Shoemaker holds that the sensible qualities our experiences represent are properties of external things, but they are mind-dependent “appearance properties” of those things.

In my work on the sensible qualities I use recent research in psychophysics to argue that objectivism is unworkable. A unique feature of my work here is that I look at work across all the sense-modalities, not just vision. Psychophysics shows that most sensible qualities simply have no suitable objective correlates. I also develop more a priori arguments against the appearance property view defended by Shoemaker and others. As against these views I favor a return to something like the traditional Galilean projectivist view, which is still strongly favored by most scientists who know the facts of sensation and perception. But I do not think that the traditional version of this view is quite right either. In particular, in my view, sensible qualities are no more “in the head” than they are “in the external world”: they are not instantiated by mental sense data, experiences, or bits of the brain. Intentionalists about experience, I argue, ought to say that they are not instantiated by anything at all. We evolved to represent colors, smells and pain qualities in the world or in bodily regions, but nothing in the world instantiates these qualities. They only live in the contents of our experiences. (My “biological intentionalism” described above provides an account of how this is possible.) Mother Nature made us so that we can get along well in our native environments. Why should this not in some cases result in embellishment or downright illusion? This neo-Galilean view of sensory experience is not as radical as it seems. It can be combined with a conciliatory semantics on which our thought and talk about the sensible character of things is true, even if sensible qualities are not really pasted on those things. (Compare how in recent metaphysics revolutionary ontologies are all the rage but they are typically combined with a conciliatory semantics.) But as a matter of fact in some cases (color and sound) I favor an error-theory even at the level of our thought and talk.

#### **(4) The role of consciousness in grounding intentionality.**

Finally, some of my most recent work has concerned the vexed issue of what fixes the content of our beliefs and desires. Here some help is provided by my anti-reductionism about phenomenal consciousness and its intentionality. On that view, the facts about an individual’s actual and potential experiences, with their rich built-in phenomenal contents, are part of the “given” or fundamental facts about him, in addition to the physical and functional facts. So when it comes to fixing the content of belief and desire, we start with a giant leg up. I argue that there are constitutive connections between experience, on the one hand, and belief and desire, on the other; and that the irreducible determinate intentionality of sensory experience helps pin down (along with relations to the environment and action) the contents of

many of our most basic beliefs and desires. In short, there is a kernel of truth in empiricist ideas about the grounding of intentionality. I have also flirted with a specific way of implementing these ideas: a highly modified version of Lewis's holistic theory of intentionality. I raise an overlooked problem for Lewis, and argue that my anti-reductive theory of experience and its intentionality just might solve it. This modified Lewisian theory of intentionality, if it can be made to work, has important consequences regarding the connection between consciousness and cognitive access as well as the nature of our introspective access to experience.

**Future research plans.**

My immediate research goal for the future is to finish work related to the issues described above, in particular, a number of essays as well as two books, one on consciousness (to be submitted to Oxford University Press) and another on perception (under contract with Routledge).

Possible future research projects and topics: a book on the sensible qualities; puzzles about consciousness and vagueness; new arguments against "Russellian Monism" about consciousness; issues concerning the descriptive, epistemic and normative significance of consciousness; introspection of experience, the measurement of sensation, and the foundations of psychophysics; puzzles involving psychophysical laws.